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Abstract 
 
This dissertation investigates the supposition that individuals with amnesia are cognitively 
“stuck in time”.  In Experiment 1, I used a Galton-Crovitz cueing paradigm to test etiologically 
diverse amnesic cases on their ability to richly recollect autobiographical episodic memories 
and imagine future experiences.  In Experiment 2, I use two behavioural economics tasks (a 
risky decision-making task and an intertemporal choice task) to examine whether amnesic 
cases’ judgment and decision-making reflects proneness to risky choices or steep disregard for 
the future.  In Experiment 3, I examine the flexibility of amnesics’ intertemporal choice by 
testing whether cueing them with personal future events increases their value of future 
rewards as it does in healthy controls.  In Experiment 4, I attempt to decrease the severity of 
amnesic cases’ episodic memory and prospection impairment by using structured and 
personally meaningful cues rather than the single cue words featured in the Galton-Crovitz 
paradigm. I replicated existing research showing that those with MTL damage have impaired 
ability to (re)construct rich and detailed narratives of past and future experiences, and I 
extended this finding for the first time to a lateral dorsal thalamic stroke case (Experiment 1).  
Despite this impairment in “mental time travel”, the same amnesic cases made financial 
decisions that a) systematically considered and valued the future and b) showed normal 
sensitivity to risk (Experiment 2).  The normalcy of intertemporal choice in amnesia extends 
beyond basic rates of future reward discounting in intertemporal choice.  In controls, cues to 
imagine future experiences can modulate decision-making by increasing the value one places 
on future rewards.  Here, most amnesic cases also retain this modulatory effect, despite having 
 iii 
impaired ability to generate detailed representations of future experiences (Experiment 3).  
Finally, I found that the severity of episodic prospection impairment in MTL amnesia is cue-
dependent and likely overestimated in current research: specific, personally meaningful cues 
lead to an appreciable reduction of episodic prospection impairment over single cue words for 
those with mild-moderate amnesia (Experiment 4).  Collectively, results challenge assumptions 
that amnesic populations are cognitively confined to the present and call for refinement to 
simple accounts of limited temporality in individuals with amnesia.   
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General introduction 
 
“And I myself was wrung with emotion - it was heartbreaking, it was absurd, it was 
deeply perplexing, to think of his life lost in limbo, dissolving.  'He is, as it were,' I wrote in my 
notes, 'isolated in a single moment of being, with a moat or lacuna of forgetting all round him… 
He is man without a past (or future), stuck in a constantly changing, meaningless moment.’”  
(Sacks, 1985, pp. 23 – 42).   
In the quote above, neurologist Oliver Sacks reflects on meeting Jimmie G., a densely 
amnesic individual with Korsakov’s syndrome.  Jimmie resembled a mariner lost at sea, stuck in 
a permanent present and unable to recall events from mere minutes past.  Like Jimmie, 
amnesic cases with medial temporal lobe (MTL) damage are often described as mentally 
confined to the “here and now” (e.g., Corkin, 2013; Dalla Barba & La Corte, 2013; Tulving, 
2002). Such individuals lack episodic memory, a distinct kind of memory that relies on the 
hippocampus and allows one to mentally revisit specific events and to recollect the details of 
such events (e.g., Bartsch & Butler, 2013; Gilboa et al., 2006; Rosenbaum et al., 2005, 2008; 
Steinvorth, Corkin, & Halgren, 2006).  Recollecting a distant family vacation, a high school 
graduation, or even a recently had conversation, are all acts of episodic memory.   
Upon meeting Jimmie, Sacks surmised that those with amnesia are not only without a 
past but are in some ways, without a future.   Endel Tulving made a similar observation when 
speaking with amnesic case K.C. K.C, a now well-studied individual, sustained a motorcycle 
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accident that erased a lifetime of episodic memories.  He was unable to richly recall a single life 
experience.   Strikingly, he also seemed unable to imagine a single future experience:   
E.T.: Let's try the question again about the future. What will you be doing tomorrow? 
[There is a 15 second pause.]  
K.C.: I don't know  
E.T.: Do you remember the question? 
K.C.: About what I’ll be doing tomorrow?  
E.T.: Yes. How would you describe your state of mind when you try to think about it? 
K.C. [a five second pause] Blank, I guess  
(Tulving, 1985, p. 4) 
Asked to provide an analogy for the blankness of mind when thinking about his future, 
K.C. said, “It’s like be (sic?) in a room with nothing there and having a guy tell you to go find a 
chair, and there’s nothing there”.  Now thirty years after this interview, the ability (or inability) 
to imagine future experiences, which in this dissertation I refer to as episodic prospection, 
continues to be the subject of prolific investigation (see Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Schacter, Addis, 
& Buckner, 2008; Szpunar, 2010; Klein, 2013a, 2015 for reviews). There is increasing recognition 
that this ability affords humans with the evolutionarily advantageous capacity to plan and make 
decisions for the future (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Boyer, 2008; Klein, 2013a).   At the same 
time there is parallel recognition that, like any cognitive faculty, this immeasurably adaptive 
ability can be taken away by injury and disease.  Thus, scientists and clinicians alike are 
motivated to better understand episodic prospection: how is it achieved, what is its relation to 
episodic memory, and without it, are individuals stuck in time?   
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Behavioural studies of healthy individuals reveal that episodic memory and prospection 
share common cognitive and phenomenological features (Szpunar & McDermott, 2008).  For 
example, the capacity for visual imagery enhances sensory experiencing in both past and future 
episodic thinking while emotional suppression reduces sensory experiencing in both aspects of 
time travel (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006).  Both abilities require disengagement from 
the present and “self-projection” into another time (Buckner & Carroll, 2007), and both require 
the generation of a coherent spatial context (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). Neuroimaging studies 
provide a large piece of the puzzle in understanding the relationship between episodic memory 
and episodic prospection and how these abilities are achieved. Numerous studies show that 
both activate a common network of brain regions in which the hippocampus is a main 
component (Okuda et al., 2003; Botzung et al., 2008; see Schacter et al., 2007 and Buckner, 
2010 for reviews).  This is particularly true during the early stages of recollecting or imagining 
an event, when the initial event is being (re)constructed (Addis, Wong, Schacter, 2007; but see 
Weiler, Suchan, & Daum, 2010). 
Though largely overlapping, episodic memory and prospection differ in some respects 
(see Suddendorf, 2010).  For example, episodic memory develops ahead of prospection; the 
latter surfaces at around four years of age (McColgan & McCormack 2008; Busby & Suddendorf, 
2009; see Martin-Ordas, Atance, & Caza, 2014 for review), and suggesting that prospection 
surpasses memory in terms of cognitive sophistication.  Recollecting episodic memories also 
appears to be a more evocative experience, phenomenologically, than its future imagining 
counterpart.  In a behavioural study with healthy adults, memories for past events contained 
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more visual and other sensory details than representations of future events (D’Argembeau, & 
Van der Linden, 2006) 
  Consistent with the idea that prospection may be more cognitively demanding, 
episodic prospection appears to engage the hippocampus to a greater degree than episodic 
memory (Addis et al., 2007; Weiler et al., 2010; but see Botzung, 2008).  But what does it mean 
for a process to be “cognitively demanding” and what makes it so?  Greater hippocampal 
activation during prospection can simply reflect more of the same processing that occurs during 
episodic memory. However, an alternate explanation is that the hippocampus is engaging in 
qualitatively different processes during prospection.   For example, additional hippocampal 
engagement during prospection may reflect the unique cognitive resources needed to generate 
novel or uncertain events.  Gaesser and colleagues (2013) investigated this question and found 
that increased hippocampal activation in episodic prospection (relative to recollection) reflects 
distinct but related processes, including construction, encoding, and novelty detection.  They 
further show that subregions of the posterior hippocampus uniquely contribute to 
construction.  
Other research shows that the core network associated with episodic thinking (which 
includes the hippocampus) is also activated during counterfactual thinking (Van Hoeck, Ma, 
Ampe, Baetens, Vandekerckhove, & Van Overwalle, 2012) and that subjective likelihood of 
imagined events during counterfactual thinking appears to modulate the degree of core 
network activation, including the right hippocampus (De Brigard, Addis, Ford, Schacter, & 
Giovanello, 2013).  Thus, increased hippocampal activation during episodic prospection may 
reflect the cognitive demand of constructing a low probability event rather than one that is 
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more likely to be available. In this view, prospection may not simply be “more” than memory, 
but also qualitatively different in its cognitive demand.   
While imaging studies make a compelling case that prospection exceeds memory in its 
need for cognitive resources, there remains a critical gap in converging evidence from lesion 
studies.  Specifically, the magnitude of amnesic cases’ prospection impairment ought to be 
greater than that of their episodic memory impairment if the hippocampus is indeed needed 
more for the former ability. However, several case studies to date have found that cases’ 
episodic memory and episodic prospection impairment are comparable in severity (e.g., Kwan 
et al., 2010; Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2011). 
Despite what differences there may be between episodic memory and episodic 
prospection, it is the similarity between these processes that has captured the interest of 
scientists.  Perhaps the most profound evidence that episodic memory and prospection share a 
common functional base is the growing body of formal case studies on hippocampal amnesia 
that confirm Sacks’ (1985) and Tulving’s (1985)  early observations: amnesic populations not 
only have impaired episodic memory but also mirrored deficits in episodic prospection (e.g., 
Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom., 2002; Kwan et al., 2010; Andelman et al., 2010; Race et al., 2011).  
This is separate from semantic and conceptual aspects of time, like understanding the temporal 
asymmetry of causation and the irrevocability of the past, which are relatively preserved in 
amnesia (Klein, 2013a; Craver, Kwan, Steindam, & Rosenbaum, 2014).     
Collectively, findings from behavioural research, developmental research, neuroimaging, 
and neuropsychological case studies converge to suggest that the MTL and hippocampus in 
  
6 
 
particular is responsible for “mental time travel,” which Tulving (2002) conceptualized as the 
ability to mentally transport one’s self to real or imagined personal events in the past or future 
(see also Ingvar, 1985, Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Dalla Barba & La Corte, 2013). However, the 
hippocampus-as-a-time-machine account of episodic thinking is likely oversimplified.  The 
model begins to fall apart when one considers that episodic memory and prospection comprise 
numerous component processes.  Episodically (re)constructing events in time requires low-level 
constructional processes, such as generating details, relating those details to one another, and 
holding these disparate details to form a cohesive representation (see Addis & Schacter, 2012)  
– such basic processes do indeed seem independent of time.  In contrast, episodically 
(re)constructing events in time also requires higher-order temporal and phenomenological 
processes, such as autonoetic consciousness and the subjective feeling of having gone back or 
forward in time (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997; D'Argembeau, Ortoleva, Jumentier, & Van der 
Linden, 2010). Many of these processes are believed to have distinct neural substrates, 
complicating the idea that mental time travel is an ability subserved by a unitary cognitive 
mechanism.  However, these dissociable processes, only some of which appear to be 
hippocampally-dependent, are confounded with each other in many existing studies.   For 
example, when amnesic populations exhibit an impaired ability to describe a past experience in 
detail, it is unclear whether this impairment reflects a deficit in the fundamental ability to 
retrieve, bind, and relate details or in the ability to travel mentally through time to re-
experience an event.  Some studies hint that the crux of episodic impairment in hippocampal 
amnesia is the former.  For example, Hassabis and colleagues (2007) found that individuals with 
hippocampal amnesia produced narratives of imagined novel experiences that lacked spatial 
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unity.  Rather, their narratives consisted of fragmented images in the absence of a holistic 
representation of the environmental setting.  Hassabis and colleagues thus suggest that the 
hippocampus is primarily responsible for scene construction, and that disrupted ability to 
generate coherent spatial scenes is the underlying deficit in hippocampal amnesia (Hassabis & 
Maguire, 2007).       
In another study, amnesic K.C. accurately recognized and discriminated details of well-
known bible stories and fairy tales, yet had difficulty using these details to form a rich and 
cohesive narrative even though the stories were impersonal and atemporal (Rosenbaum, 
Gilboa, Levine, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2009).  Rosenbaum suggested that amnesia is thus an 
impairment in the (re)constructive processes of generating and binding details.  A related idea 
is the constructive simulation hypothesis, which Addis and colleagues have put forth to explain 
the relationship among the hippocampus, episodic memory, and episodic prospection.  
According to this hypothesis, a temporally malleable episodic system  
… can draw on elements of the past and retain the general sense or gist of what 
has happened. Critically, it can flexibly extract, recombine and reassemble these 
elements in a way that allows us to simulate, imagine or ‘pre-experience’ events 
that have never occurred previously in the exact form in which we imagine 
them…the constructive nature of episodic memory is attributable, at least in 
part, to the role of the episodic system in allowing us to mentally simulate our 
personal futures” (Schacter & Addis, 2007).   
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The hypothesis also posits that the hippocampus critically facilitates episodic simulation, 
although mapping specific component processes onto hippocampal subfields is an ongoing 
endeavor (Addis & Schacter, 2012).  
There is also an argument that the deficit in hippocampal amnesia is one of a more basic 
nature. Using eye-tracking data, Ryan and colleagues (2000, 2004) found that individuals with 
hippocampal amnesia failed to show implicit memory of constituent elements in a complex 
scene.  Specifically, they were unable to retain the relations among the constituent elements of 
a scene, such as where an object appeared in relation to the scene or where an object 
appeared in relation to other objects in the scene. The authors suggest that hippocampal 
impairment reflects a basic deficit in relational memory (Cohen et al., 1999; Eichenbaum, 1999; 
Konkel & Cohen, 2009).  Additional studies support the relational memory account of 
hippocampal amnesia, showing that the binding deficit occurs even at short delays (Hannula, 
Tranel, & Cohen, 2006) and that it extends to all types of relations (Konkel, Warren, Duff, 
Tranel, & Cohen, 2008).  
An elegant imaging study with healthy individuals casts further doubt over whether the 
hippocampus contributes to time-dependent thinking outside of basic constructional or 
relational processes.  In this study, Nyberg and colleagues (2010) attempted to isolate the 
neural substrates of subjective temporal consciousness in a task that minimized any demand on 
detailed construction.  Participants repeatedly imagined taking the same short walk in a familiar 
environment, doing so either in the imagined past, present, or future. As a control 
condition, they also recollected an instance in which they actually performed the same short 
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walk in the same familiar setting.  Thinking about taking a walk in the past or future activated a 
network of frontal, cerebellar, and thalamic brain regions but did not include the hippocampus.   
The authors conclude that there is no evidence of hippocampal contribution to subjective time 
travel.    Similarly, Szpunar, Watson, & McDerrott (2007) scanned healthy participants while 
they imagined themselves in personal past or future events.  Participants were required to 
come up with as vivid an image as they could for the duration of each 10-second trial but were 
never required to respond - participants simply imagined themselves without having to 
construct a narrative.  The authors did not find hippocampal activation during past 
remembering or future imagining.  
Nyberg and Szpunar’s studies raise an important point about time travel – there are 
numerous ways in which humans can mentally transcend the present and travel through time, 
with narratives of their recollected or imagined experiences but one type of metric for this 
ability.   Despite widespread acceptance of the idea that episodic amnesia traps individuals in a 
“permanent present tense,” recent findings argue that that this metaphor distorts the true 
state of temporal consciousness in such populations.  Individuals with episodic amnesia actually 
retain much of their ability to think and reason about the past and future, apparently using 
non-episodic cognitive systems, when probed with tasks that do not require construction (Klein, 
2013a).   There is a clear emerging need to re-evaluate and more closely examine the status of 
time-based thinking outside of basic constructive demand. Perhaps the loss of time in amnesia 
is misunderstood. 
Overview of experiments 
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 In this dissertation I conduct a series of experiments investigating both constructive and 
non-constructive aspects of time-based thinking in order to understand the underlying deficit in 
medial temporal lobe amnesia.  In Experiment 1, I use a Galton-Crovitz cueing paradigm to test 
a group of etiologically diverse amnesic cases on their ability to richly recollect autobiographical 
memories and imagine future experiences.  In Experiment 2, I use two well-established 
behavioural economics tasks (an intertemporal choice task and a risky decision-making task) to 
examine whether amnesic cases’ judgment and decision-making reflects steep disregard for the 
future or proneness to risky choices.  In Experiment 3, I examine the flexibility of amnesics’ 
intertemporal choice by testing whether cueing them with personal future events increases 
their value of future rewards as it does in healthy controls.  In Experiment 4, I examine whether 
I can decrease the severity of amnesic cases’ episodic memory and prospection impairment by 
using structured and personally meaningful cues rather than the single cue words featured in 
the widely used Galton-Crovitz paradigm.  
Statistical approach 
This dissertation features a series-of-case-studies approach.  I analyzed all amnesic cases 
individually using a descriptive neuropsychological approach to quantify the degree of 
impairment in each case.  This approach involves calculating participants’ z-scores relative to 
control groups and then using a standardized psychometric conversion table based on the Wide 
Range Achievement Test-Third Edition, Administration Manual (WRAT-III, Wilkinson, 1993, 
Appendix A) to derive quantitative (estimated percentile rankings) and qualitative (diagnostic 
labels) estimates of impairment. 
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The neuropsychological approach compares to standard null hypothesis significance 
testing (NHST) in the following ways:  In NHST, “significance” is an all-or-none inference that 
occurs when an obtained p-value is below a predetermined alpha (i.e., p < 0.05).  NHST is 
problematic for neuropsychological studies such as ours, which feature small sample sizes of 
rare populations and thus lack statistical power to reject the null.  NHST also requires averaging 
patients’ performance to compare a single score to that of controls’.  Clinical cases are often 
averaged in this manner to increase statistical power and reduce unwanted noise, but the 
average is not always representative of performance in each case (Rosenbaum, Gilboa, & 
Moscovitch, 2014; Schwartz & Dell, 2010) and this practice potentially obscures clinically 
informative differences among amnesic cases.  Holdstock and colleagues (2008) illustrated the 
issues that arise in averaging neuropsychological cases’ performance in a study that directly 
compared two individuals with hippocampal damage. Despite very similar and selective 
hippocampal lesions, “Patient A.C.” demonstrated surprisingly intact and, on some measures, 
above average memory performance whereas “Patient P.R.” demonstrated typical impairment 
on measures of recollection and highly variable performance on measures of recognition. The 
authors concluded that even seemingly selective hippocampal damage can have highly variable 
effects on memory. 
In contrast, the neuropsychological approach is an alternative method that both 
quantitatively and qualitatively assesses the degree to which a patient’s score deviates from 
that of controls’.   This approach circumvents the frequent statistical limitations of patient 
studies that typically feature small sample sizes of rare populations. A neuropsychological 
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approach is sensitive to variability among cases and allows discussion of each amnesic 
individual in clinically meaningful terms with respect to impairment severity.  
This approach adheres to broader statistical guidelines put forth in recently revived 
efforts to build a more replicable psychological science (i.e. the “new statistics”, Cumming, 
2013; Eich, 2014; Maner, 2014).  These guidelines argue for continuous, estimation-based 
thinking rather than dichotomous thinking, and for shifting away from p-values as the sole 
metric of statistical meaning. The movement toward “new statistics” alternatives is particularly 
relevant in neuropsychological research where small sample sizes and uneven groups push the 
boundaries and assumptions of standard NHST (Kakzanis, 2001).  
 
Experiment 1 
 
Episodic Memory and Episodic Prospection 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The necessity of the hippocampus for episodic memory and prospection is generally 
accepted, but not without controversy (see Addis & Schacter, 2012 for review).  For example, a 
developmental amnesic case, H.C., had significantly impaired episodic memory and episodic 
prospection impairment upon initial assessment (Kwan et al., 2010). However, she and other 
developmental amnesic cases with MTL damage showed intact episodic prospection in 
subsequent testing using more elaborate, full-sentence scenario cues (e.g., “Imagine you are 
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walking along a busy fishing harbor”; “Imagine how you will spend next Christmas”) (Cooper et 
al., 2011; Hurley et al., 2011).  Several explanations exist for the discrepancies in findings.  In 
addition to more elaborate scenario-cues, those with amnesia of developmental origin typically 
have more circumscribed hippocampal lesions and may have better preserved function than 
their adult-onset counterparts (see Vargha-Khadem, Gadian, & Mishkin, 2001, for review).    
There is greater consensus that hippocampal damage interferes with both episodic 
memory and prospection among adult-onset cases - several researchers have replicated this 
finding with different cases (Tulving, 1985; Klein et al., 2002; Andelman et al., 2010; Race et al., 
2011).  Beyond hippocampal amnesia, other populations with decreased hippocampal function 
also have impoverished episodic thinking (mild cognitive impairment, Gamboz et al., 2010; 
healthy aging, Addis et al., 2008).  However, some argue that episodic prospection functions 
independently of the hippocampus.  For example, Squire et al., (2010) suggests that lesions 
outside of the hippocampus may better explain episodic prospection impairments previously 
attributed to hippocampal damage and that frontal executive rather than medial temporal 
neuropsychological impairments contribute to episodic impairment.   Squire and colleagues 
further argue that the hippocampus does not critically contribute to basic constructive 
processes that are independent of time, such as scene construction (Kim, Dede, Hopkins, & 
Squire, 2015).  This debate is in some ways an extension of an old and ongoing controversy over 
whether the hippocampus is needed for remote episodic memory (see Nadel & Moscovitch, 
1997; Frankland, & Bontempi, 2005; Squire & Bayley, 2007 for reviews).  
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Given the current debate there is a clear need for continued case studies on how or if 
hippocampal damage affects episodic memory and prospection.  The purpose of the present 
study is to formally assess episodic memory and episodic prospection in a group of etiologically 
diverse, adult-onset amnesic cases with varied selectivity of hippocampal damage.   
 
1.2 Methods 
1.2.1 Participants 
Amnesic cases. The amnesic individuals in our study represent six unique 
neuropsychological cases that arose from a range of etiologies and differ in the severity of 
memory impairment (see below for detailed case descriptions).  To meet the operational 
definition of “amnesic” for the purposes of this research, cases were required to meet each of 
the following criteria: (1) neuroanatomically, damage to the MTLs or other areas in the 
extended hippocampal system (Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Edelstyn, Hunter, & Ellis, 2006) as 
verified on MRI, (2) neuropsychologically, documented anterograde memory impairment on 
measures of delayed free recall (i.e., 1st percentile or less) in at least one modality (visual or 
verbal) and in the context of otherwise intact overall intellectual functioning (FSIQ = 90 or 
higher), and (3) functionally, impaired ability to sustain full-time employment as a result of 
cognitive impairments.    
I recruited and tested the following cases to observe whether degree of memory loss 
would correspond with the magnitude of any observed impairments.  The individuals’ 
  
15 
 
demographic information, neuropsychological findings, and measures of past and future 
episodic thought are summarized in Table 1.  
K.C.  K.C. was 57 years old at the time of testing, was right handed, and had 16 years of 
formal education.  As mentioned, his case is well-documented in the literature.  K.C. sustained a 
closed-head injury from a motorcycle accident in 1981 when he was 30 years old.  His MRI 
scans revealed extensive volume loss in MTL structures, most notably the hippocampal 
formation and surrounding parahippocampal gyrus, bilaterally (Fig. 1).  Additional affected 
areas include the septal area, posterior thalamus, and caudate nucleus, bilaterally, as well as 
the left amygdala, mammillary bodies, and anterior thalamus (Rosenbaum et al., 2005).  
Despite his widespread damage, K.C. had preserved semantic memory that remained 
stable after his accident (Rosenbaum et al., 2005).  When tested, he exhibited a conservative 
response bias with no evidence of confabulation.  K.C. continued to demonstrate average IQ 
and relatively preserved cognitive functioning until his passing in 2014.  One major exception to 
K.C.’s intact functioning was his episodic memory.  His head injury caused dense amnesia, both 
retrograde and anterograde, leaving him without episodic memory for any details of personal 
experiences (see Rosenbaum et al., 2005 for detailed neuroanatomical and neuropsychological 
profiles).  
D.A.  D.A. was 59 years old at the time of testing.  He is a right-handed man with 17 
years of education who contracted herpes encephalitis in 1993 and has been the subject of 
previous studies on MTL amnesia (Rosenbaum et al., 2008; Westmacott et al., 2004; Roy & 
Park, 2010).  His MRI scans reveal severe damage to MTL structures, affecting the right side 
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substantially more than the left (Fig. 1).   His right sided damage includes lesions to the 
hippocampus (damaged by over 90%), perirhinal, entorhinal, and parahippocampal cortices, as 
well as the anterior temporal lobe.  In the right hemisphere, D.A. has additional volume 
reductions in regions outside of the MTL, including posterior temporal, ventral frontal, occipital 
regions, anterior cingulate, and posterior thalamus.  Little volume loss was reported in the right 
dorsal frontal, superior and inferior parietal, and posterior cingulate regions.   D.A.’s left sided 
damage includes hippocampal volume reduction by over 50%, as well as damage to the 
perirhinal, entorhinal, and parahippocampal cortices (see Roy & Park, 2010).  
Like K.C., D.A.’s brain damage was accompanied by a pattern of preserved semantic but 
impaired episodic memory.  He continues to have average IQ and intact cognitive function 
outside of episodic memory.  Within the episodic domain, D.A. has a moderate retrograde 
amnesia that is temporally graded (better remote than recent memory) and a significant 
anterograde amnesia for personal experiences (see Rosenbaum et al., 2008 for 
neuroanatomical and neuropsychological profiles).  He is able to talk about some past 
experiences with apparent vividness, detail, and episodic richness, such as when he proposed 
to his wife.  However, it is likely that many of these experiences have been retold over the years 
and are now represented in semantic memory, given that D.A. will often re-tell stories of 
personal happenings to the same person almost verbatim. 
D.G.  D.G. was 47 years old at the time of testing.  He is a right-handed man with 16 
years of education.  D.G. is a husband and father of two who worked as a civil engineer and was 
an avid hockey player and golfer until his injury.  In 2010, D.G.’s wife awoke in the middle of the 
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night to what she thought was snoring and discovered that D.G. was in cardiac arrest.  She 
initiated chest compressions until an ambulance arrived and worked for an additional thirty 
minutes during which D.G. was treated by defibrillator.  He was then transferred to hospital 
where he received hypothermic treatment.  He arrested twice more while in emergency 
treatment and was treated by defibrillator each time.  He did not regain consciousness until 
approximately 48 hours after the initial incident. DG shows the characteristic 
neuropsychological pattern of impairment that typically follows cardiac arrest:  he has 
preserved semantic but impaired episodic memory with accompanying dysarthric motor 
deficits (Lim et al., 2004). D.G. had an implantable cardioverter-defibrillator inserted following 
the arrest and is thus unable to undergo MRI. 
Upon awakening in the hospital, he estimated that he was 22 years old – half of his 
actual age at the time.  He had no memory of his children, of his home, or of several close 
friends.  In the months following his injury, he recovered personal semantic memory (e.g., 
recognition of family members and friends, his home address), although there was evidence of 
sustained episodic memory impairment along with dysarthria and some loss of fine motor 
control.  Neuropsychological testing conducted approximately two and a half years post-injury 
revealed that he continues to have average IQ and intact cognitive function outside of episodic 
memory.  Within the episodic domain, D.G. has a temporally graded retrograde amnesia and an 
anterograde amnesia for personal experiences. D.G.’s wife describes his current memory 
function as “spotty”:  he is able to describe some experiences in a gist-like fashion but admits 
that “a lot of it is guesswork because [he is] not very sure”.  For example, he describes as one of 
his fondest memories taking a trip with friends to attend the practice round of the Masters 
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Tournament the year following his injury. However, he reported only having “bits and pieces of 
the day” and is uncertain about key details of the event, such as who played in the tournament.  
There are other significant life events that he is completely unable to recall, including his 
wedding day and moving into his current house. 
L.D. L.D. was 61 years old at the time of testing and has 19 years of education. L.D. has a 
history of complex partial seizures dating back to June 2000, when MRI revealed a left 
hippocampal lesion. In 2007, L.D. developed a growth in the left parahippocampal region.  He 
underwent a left temporal lobectomy and amygdalohippocampectomy to treat refractory 
temporal lobe epilepsy in 2011.  Surgical resection of the middle temporal gyrus, hippocampus, 
uncus, and amygdala successfully ameliorated seizures but exacerbated his memory 
impairment.  Neuropsychological testing revealed a stable pattern of average overall 
intellectual function and low semantic fluency but a steady decline in episodic memory, 
particularly for verbal material, over repeated assessments.  After surgical resection, L.D.’s 
episodic memory further deteriorated relative to pre-surgical functioning.  L.D. currently 
reports difficulty with day-to-day memory, such as remembering the content of recent 
conversations.   
B.L.  B.L. was 52 years old at the time of testing and has 13 years of education. In 1985, 
B.L. was diagnosed with anoxic brain injury secondary to electrocution and cardiac arrest.  He 
has little recall of the incident. MRI showed clear bilateral lesions in the hippocampus with 
hyperintensities consistent with hippocampal sclerosis. Hippocampal lesions were primarily 
limited to the dentate gyrus with relative sparing of the CA1 and CA3 subfields and the 
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surrounding parahippocampal cortices.  Cerebral atrophy with mild enlargement of ventricles 
and cortical sulci also was apparent.  Repeated neuropsychological examinations revealed a 
stable pattern of spared and impaired function.  B.L. has borderline-low average memory for 
verbal material and stark memory impairment for non-verbal material in the context of average 
intellectual function.  Motor speed and dexterity are also affected, and there is evidence of mild 
executive difficulties affecting planning, mental flexibility, and self-monitoring.      
S.N.   S.N. was 46 years old at the time of testing and has 12 years of education. In 2011, 
he suddenly experienced nausea, vomiting, and decreased consciousness, and presented at the 
hospital with right hemiparesis and right hypesthesia.  Initial CT showed a left thalamic 
hemorrhage likely secondary to acute hypertension. MRI at four months post-stroke revealed a 
resolving left thalamic hemorrhagic stroke with no obvious underlying vessel malformation. 
Primary lesions were bilateral in the lateral dorsal thalamus (greater on the left). MRI also 
revealed a left pontine lesion suspected to be ischemic in nature and smaller lesions in the left 
pons, right putamen, and left occipital lobe medial to the occipital horn. Within the MTL, there 
was a localized left hippocampal lesion. The perirhinal, entorhinal, and parahippocampal 
cortices were intact, as were the fornix and mammillary bodies.   
S.N. was initially unable to recognize close family members, including his parents.  
During the course of lengthy rehabilitation, he recovered personal semantic memory (e.g., 
recognition of family members and friends, and his home address) but continues to exhibit an 
episodic memory impairment and anterograde amnesia.  For example, he has difficulty recalling 
recent conversations and tends to repeat questions and retell stories during testing.  
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Neuropsychological assessment at nine months post-stroke revealed high average overall 
intellectual functioning but severe, selective impairments in episodic memory, particularly in 
encoding of verbal information.  He showed additional impairments in verbal fluency and 
inhibitory control.  
Each amnesic case gave informed, written consent in accordance with the Human 
Research Ethics Committees of York University and Baycrest, and received monetary 
compensation for their time.  
Controls.  Control data were taken from Addis et al.’s (2008) healthy older adult sample 
(n = 16, six male, Mage = 72.313, SD = 5.003).     
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Figure 1.1. Coronal T1 MRI slices of damage for (A) K.C., (B) D.A., (C) L.D., (D), B.L., and (E) S.N. Images are presented according to 
radiological convention (right hemisphere is presented on left side of image). D.G. could not be scanned because of an implantable 
cardioverter defibrillator.
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Table 1.1 Amnesic cases’ demographic and neuropsychological data 
 
 K.C. D.A. D.G. L.D. B.L. S.N. 
 
Age at injury 30 47 44 ~48 25 44 
Age at testing 57 59 47 61 52 46  
Etiology TBI Encephalitis Anoxia TLR Anoxia Stroke 
Education (years) 16 17 16 19 13 12 
 
Full Scale IQ 99 117 99 111 92 114 
 Verbal IQ 99 121 83 117 -- -- 
 Performance IQ 99 106 104 105 -- --  
 
Verbal Learning 
 Acquisition  < 1st%  < 1st% 3rd – 6th% 1st% 21st -32nd% 1st% 
 Short delay free recall < 1st% < 1st% 2nd % < 1st % < 1st % 2nd -3rd % 
 Long delay free recall < 1st% < 1st% 6th – 7th%  1st% 14th – 19th%  <1st%  
 Recognition discrimination < 1st%  < 1st% 16th% < 0% 50th%  <1st%  
 
Logical passages/memory I 5th%  15th% -- 50th% 25th% < 1st%  
Logical passages/memory II < 1st% < 1st% -- < 1st% 8th – 13th% < 1st%  
 
Rey Osterrieth Complex Figure 
 Copy /36 36 35 30 29 35 30  
 Delayed recall < 1st% < 1st% < 1st% 21st -32nd% < 1st% 1st% 
 
Boston Naming /60 57 56 56 36 -- 52 
Letter Fluency 7th -13th% 21st – 32nd% 7th -13th  21st -32nd % 58th -68th  21st – 32nd% 
 
Wisconsin Card Sort Task /6 6 6 6 6 6 3  
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Notes: Notes: TBI, traumatic brain injury; TLR, temporal lobe resection; Full Scale IQ, Verbal IQ, and 
Performance IQ based on Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Revised for K.C., D.A., and D.G., Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence–III for L.D. and S.N., and Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence –IV 
for B.L. 
Verbal learning is based on California Verbal Learning Test-II for K.C., D.A., D.G., and B.L., Hopkins Verbal 
Learning Test – Revised for L.D., Kaplan Baycrest Neurocognitive Assessment, Word List Learning for S.N. 
Logical passages/memory is based on the Wechsler Memory Scale – Revised for K.C. and D.A., Wechsler 
Memory Scale III for L.D. and S.N., and Wechsler Memory Scale IV for B.L.  
Letter fluency is based on the average number of words produced for the letters F, A, and S in a given 
minute per letter. 
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1.2.2 Procedure 
A Galton-Crovitz cueing paradigm in which cue words are used to elicit narratives of 
personal events was administered to participants (Crovitz & Schiffman, 1974; see Addis et al., 
2008 for detailed task description). Participants were asked to remember five personal past 
events (up to five years ago) and to imagine five personal future events (up to five years into 
the future). The task unfolded as follows: on each trial, participants were presented with a 
single cue word on a computer screen along with a time condition (past or future). Participants 
were instructed to use the cue to help generate a personal event that occurred in the past or 
that could occur in the future, depending on the time condition. I explained that the cue was a 
tool to help generate an event, and that the event itself need not be related to the cue. For past 
trials, participants were asked to recall specific, personally-experienced events in as much detail 
as possible. For future trials, participants were asked to imagine specific novel events that they 
might personally experience in the future in as much detail as possible. Each trial lasted five 
minutes, with the cue word and time frame appearing in full view for the duration of the trial. 
I gave one general probe (i.e., “Is there anything (else) you can remember/imagine?”) when 
approximately 30 seconds of silence had elapsed.  Sessions were recorded using a digital audio 
recorder and then transcribed. 
 Scoring. The standard scoring procedure for the autobiographical interview (AI) was 
used to assess the detail and quality of participants’ past and future events (Levine, Svodoba, 
Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002). All details were segmented and categorized as either 
internal or external. Internal details refer to specific episodic information about the central 
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event. External details are non-episodic details provided by participants that are tangential or 
unrelated to the central event, semantic facts, repetitions, or metacognitive 
statements/editorializing. For each time condition, I tallied and averaged the number of 
internal and external details to determine an overall index for each type of detail generated by 
each participant. Given that the task was to produce details of a specific event, internal details 
were expected to outnumber external details on every trial.  
1.3 Results 
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 respectively show that amnesic cases both recollect past experiences 
and imagine future experiences in lesser episodic detail than controls.  To statistically assess the 
magnitude of these impairments, I used the aforementioned neuropsychological approach.  As 
expected, individuals with amnesia showed varying degrees of impairment in both episodic 
memory and prospection.  All scores were at or below the clinical threshold for borderline 
impairment (i.e., 8th percentile).  The only exception was L.D.’s prospection, which was within 
the low average range.   
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Figure 1.2 Amnesic cases and controls’ average number of internal details for remembered past 
events.  Error bar represents standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 1.3 Amnesic cases and controls’ average number of internal details for imagined 
prospective events.  Error bar represents standard error of the mean.   
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Table 1.2 Episodic memory and episodic prospection in amnesic cases 
 
 
Episodic Autobiographical Memory 
 
 
 Internal details External details  
 
Case  z-score  %ile rank  descriptive label z-score  %ile rank  descriptive label 
 
KC -3.451 < 1st Impaired -1.987 2nd – 3rd   Borderline  
DA -1.802 3rd – 4th  Borderline -0.490 30th – 32nd   Average 
DG -3.200  < 1st   Impaired  -1.724  4th  Borderline 
LD -2.124  1st – 2nd   Impaired   0.673 75th     High average 
BL -2.003 2nd    Borderline - Impaired  1.022 86th     High average   
SN -1.762 3rd – 4th   Borderline  3.117 >99th    Very superior 
     
 
Episodic Prospection 
 
 
 Internal details External details  
 
Case  z-score  %ile rank  descriptive label z-score  %ile rank  descriptive label 
 
KC -2.676 < 1st  Impaired  -2.197 1st -2nd    Impaired  
DA -1.653 4th – 5th  Borderline -0.721  19th - 21st Average-Low Avg.  
DG -2.459  < 1st  Impaired  -1.850  3rd -4th    Borderline 
LD -0.891 18th – 19th   Low average   0.404 66th    Average 
BL -1.432 7th – 8th  Borderline   1.459  92nd – 93rd   Superior 
SN         -2.074 2nd  Impaired    1.230 88th – 90th    High average  
  
Higher ‘External details’ scores indicate an access of details 
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1.4  Conclusion  
 I used a series-of-case-studies approach to assess episodic memory and prospection in 
six adult-onset amnesic cases with varying etiologies and selectivity of hippocampal damage.    
Both memory of past experiences and simulation of future experiences were either borderline 
or outright impaired in the assessed cases.  The only exception was L.D.’s prospection, which 
fell within the low end of average range.  Results from the current study are consistent with the 
majority of previously reported cases in the literature (i.e. Race et al., 2011).  Amnesic case 
B.L.’s performance is particularly relevant to the debate over whether the hippocampus is 
needed for episodic (re)construction. He has highly selective lesions that are circumscribed not 
only to the hippocampus, but to the dentate gyrus with relative sparing of other hippocampal 
subfields and the surrounding parahippocampal cortices. However, his lesions sufficiently 
impaired both recall of remote past experiences and imagination of future experiences.   B.L.’s 
performance is inconsistent with Squire et al. (2010)’s assertion that deficits in remote episodic 
memory and episodic prospection are an artifact of lesions beyond the hippocampus proper.  
While the majority of studies on episodic prospection focus on the MTL, and the 
hippocampus in particular, less is known about the function of other structures within the   
extended hippocampal system, including the fornix, mammillary bodies, and parts of the 
thalamus (see Aggleton & Brown, 1999). The thalamus is often active when healthy individuals 
engage in episodic prospection (e.g. Szpunar et al., 2007; Viard et al., 2011) yet perhaps due to 
the rarity of such populations, neuropsychological studies documenting how thalamic lesions 
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may affect episodic (re)construction are lacking.  In one such study, an individual with bilateral 
lateral dorsal thalamic lesions showed impaired recollection on lab-based tests of episodic 
memory (Edelstyn, Hunter, & Ellis, 2006).  More recently two cases with medial dorsal thalamic 
lesions showed selectively impaired prospection with preserved episodic memory (Weiler, 
Suchan, Koch, Schwarz, & Daum, 2011).   In the present study, amnesic case S.N. demonstrates 
for the first time that a lateral dorsal thalamic lesion, much like a hippocampal lesion, can also 
cause episodic (re)construction deficits for both past and future events.  This finding further 
enforces that this area of the thalamus should be considered part of the extended hippocampal 
system (Edelstyn et al., 2006).  It reinforces the consideration of episodic thinking as a system, 
and highlights the need for continued investigation to establish how the hippocampus and 
structures within the extended hippocampal system contribute to time-based thinking. 
 A potential limitation of this study is that the controls used in this study differed from 
the amnesic cases in that the controls were primarily female and were a mean age of 72 years, 
which is substantially older than the younger, all-male amnesic cases. There are few direct 
studies on sex difference in episodic prospection; some studies combine data from male and 
female participants after finding no effect of sex (e.g. Irish, Addis, Hodges, & Piguet, 2012; 
Murphy, Troyer, Levine, & Moscovitch, 2008).  However, one study specifically investigating sex 
differences does show that women recollected past events and imagined future events with 
greater specificity than men (Wang, Hou, Tang, & Wiprovnick, 2011).  An implication of this 
finding for the current study is that the magnitude of impairment in the amnesic cases could be 
inflated due to the predominately female control group.  Conversely, research on aging and 
episodic prospection makes a counter suggestion: normal aging (as well as age-related 
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disorders) are associated with both reduced episodic memory and reduced episodic 
prospection (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008; Gaesser, Sacchetti, Addis, & Schacter, 2011; see 
Schacter, Gaesser, & Addis, 2012, for a review).  This well-established finding suggests that the 
magnitude of amnesic cases’ impairment might actually be underestimated in light of the older 
control group.   
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Experiment 2 
 
Risky Decision-Making and Intertemporal Choice   
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
  Results from Experiment 1 established episodic memory and prospection impairments 
in a group of individuals with MTL amnesia.  In the present study, I focus specifically on 
prospective aspects of time-based thinking and attempt to disentangle temporal from 
constructive processes using decision-making tasks that require the former but not the latter.   
Decisional disregard for the future is often associated with impulsivity.  Researchers 
posit that impulsive behavior might arise from distorted estimations of temporal duration and 
otherwise altered temporal experience (Barratt, 1983; Takahashi, 2006; Whittmann, Leland, 
Churan, & Paulus, 2007; Whittmann & Paulus, 2008; but see Lennings & Burns, 1998, Glicksohn, 
Leshem, & Aharoni, 2006).  According to Cottle (1977; cited in Lennings, Burns, & Cooney, 
1998), those who are cognitively biased toward the present and who do not integrate the past 
with the future are also more impulsive than those with a more holistic time perspective. Cottle 
also conceptualized such individuals’ experience of time as a series of discontinuous points 
rather than as a unified and flowing entity.  This description would seem to fit the experience of 
people with amnesia who are unable to mentally (re)construct their past or future experiences 
and who lack memory to bridge their experiences across time (Roberts, 2002; Tulving, 2002).   
However, impulsivity is a multidimensional construct that lacks specificity in describing one’s 
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decision-making patterns (see Green & Myerson, 2013 for review).  In the next section I discuss 
two features of decision-making that may differentially respond to changes in one’s temporal 
consciousness.   
 
Probabilistic and Delay Discounting: distinct ways of disregarding one’s future 
Numerous studies have linked two well-documented behaviours, risk-taking and delay 
discounting, to distortions in or neglect of future-oriented thinking.  For example, college 
students who view their futures as uncertain and unstable are also more likely to engage in 
risky behaviour (Hill, Ross, & Low, 1997).  Indeed a variety of risk-taking behaviours, such as 
illicit drug use, risky driving, and even sub-optimal corporate decisions (“managerial myopia”), 
have been attributed to a cognitive overemphasis on the present and a failure to adequately 
take the future into consideration (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Petry, Bickel, & Arnett, 1998; 
Zimbardo, Keough, & Boyd, 1997).  
Probability discounting is a widely used measure of risk-taking in which individuals 
choose between a smaller, certain reward and a larger, risky reward.  One’s probabilistic 
discount rate refers to the decrease in the subjective value of an uncertain reward as the odds 
against receiving it (i.e., the percentage probability of not receiving an award) increases.  As 
such, steeper probabilistic discounting reflects a greater aversion to risk.  Although probabilistic 
decision-making does not require explicit consideration of the future, the research summarized 
above suggests that one’s appetite for risk implicitly reflects attitudes or beliefs about his/her 
future.  It is unknown if amnesic populations with cognitive impairments in episodic 
prospection show shallow discounting of probabilistic choices, revealing lost sensitivity to risk.  
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Intertemporal choice is a widely used measure of delay discounting in which individuals 
choose between a smaller, immediate reward and a larger, delayed reward.  One’s delay 
discounting rate refers to the decrease in the subjective value of the future reward as the delay 
until its receipt increases.  As such, shallow delay discounting reflects a higher valuation of the 
future.   In contrast to risky decision-making, intertemporal choice explicitly pits the present 
against the future and requires one to take temporal delays into systematic consideration.   
There are differing ideas about how episodic prospection may influence one’s delay 
discounting.  One thought is that the ability to imagine one’s future serves an evolutionary 
purpose in nudging decisions in favour of the future (Boyer, 2008).  Based on this hypothesis, 
individuals with episodic prospection impairment could be biased toward immediate rewards 
over delayed rewards.  Alternatively, Luhmann and colleagues (2008) postulate that imagining 
one’s future in delay discounting is associated with the negative experience of waiting; to avoid 
that negative experience; individuals are thus biased toward present rewards. Based on these 
two accounts, it is unclear if or how inability to imagine one’s future might influence delay 
discounting rates in intertemporal choice.   
 Some argue that processes underlying probabilistic and delay discounting are one in the 
same (e.g., Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991).  For example, both forms of discounting fit a 
hyperbola-like function, are positively correlated within subjects, and are correlated with 
personality measures of impulsivity (Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, & Wit, 1999).  This and other 
studies have led to a conclusion that probabilistic and delay discounting are interchangeable 
measures of impulsivity.  However, subsequent studies show that a single-process account of 
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probability and delay discounting (i.e., impulsivity) is insufficient:  the two tasks show 
differential patterns in psychiatric populations (Crean, de Wit, & Richards, 2000) and respond in 
opposite ways to manipulations of the reward amount (e.g., Green Myerson, & 
Ostaszewski,1999; Myerson, Green, Hanson, Holt, & Estle, 2003; see Green & Myerson, 2013 
for review).    
Given that risk-taking and intertemporal choice may reflect different facets of 
prospective thinking, I tested amnesic cases on both measures to investigate whether their 
decisions are abnormal in their sensitivity to risk and time.  Such decision-making tasks are non-
constructive metrics of future-oriented thinking and provide a window into whether amnesic 
individuals make decisions as if they are bound to the present.   
 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1. Participants 
Amnesic cases.  The same amnesic cases who participated in Experiment 1 
participated in the current study. 
Controls.  Twenty control participants (12 male; mean age = 69.25 years, SD = 7.00 
years; mean education = 17.05 years; SD = 3.20 years) with no known history of psychiatric or 
neurological disorders participated in this study.  Controls were screened for variables 
associated with deviant discounting behaviour, including smoking, significant alcohol use, and 
problem gambling.  All participants are fluent in English and right-handed.  Participants gave 
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informed written consent in accordance with the Human Research Ethics Committees of York 
University and Baycrest, and received monetary compensation for their time. 
2.2.2. Measures and Procedure 
Risky decision-making task.  Amnesic cases and control participants completed a 
computerized version of an established measure of probability discounting (Green & Myerson, 
2004).  Participants were told that the task involved assessing preferences and that there were 
no correct or incorrect choices.  Participants made a series of choices between two hypothetical 
monetary amounts: a smaller, certain or “sure” reward and a larger, probabilistic reward.  For 
each of two probabilistic amounts ($250 and $2,000), participants made six choices at each of 
six probabilities (described to the participants as a 90%, 75%, 50%, 20%, 10%, and 5% chance), 
presented in random order.   
For both the $250 and $2,000 conditions, the amount of the certain reward judged 
equal in subjective value to the probabilistic reward was determined at each probability using 
an iterative, adjusting-amount procedure. The first choice at each probability was between the 
probabilistic amount and a certain amount that was equal to half of the probabilistic amount 
(e.g., a 75% chance at $2,000 or $1,000 for sure).  For each of the subsequent choices at that 
certain amount, the probability of the chance reward was adjusted based on the participant's 
previous choice. If the participant chose the certain reward, then the probability of the chance 
reward was increased on the following trial; if the participant chose the probabilistic reward, 
then the probability on that reward was decreased on the next trial. The size of the adjustment 
to the probability of the chance reward after the first choice was half of the initial probability.  
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The size of the adjustment to the probabilistic reward then decreased with each successive 
choice and was always equal to half of the previous adjustment, rounded to the nearest 
percentage.  For example, in the condition with a 75% chance of receiving $2,000, the choice on 
the first trial would be between “75% chance of receiving $2,000” and “$1,000 for sure.”  If the 
participant chose “75% chance of receiving $2,000,” the choice on the second trial would be 
between “50% chance of receiving $2,000” and “$1,000 for sure.”  If the participant then chose 
“50% chance of receiving $2,000,” the choice on the third trial would be between “25% chance 
of receiving $2,000” and “$1,000 for sure.”  This iterative procedure converged rapidly on the 
certain amount subjectively equivalent to the probabilistic amount (for full details, see Myerson 
et al., 2003).  The certain amount that would have been presented on a seventh trial was used 
as an estimate of the subjective value of the probabilistic reward at each probability.  
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Figure 2.1   A sample trial from the risky decision-making task. Participants were presented with 
two hypothetical rewards and indicated their decision between the smaller sure reward and the 
larger risky reward.  
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Intertemporal choice task. Amnesic cases and controls completed a computerized 
version of an established measure of delay discounting (Green & Myerson, 2004).  Participants 
made a series of choices between two hypothetical monetary rewards – a smaller, immediate 
amount and a larger, future amount.  They were told that the task assesses preferences and 
that there are no correct or incorrect choices. For each of two future amounts ($100 and 
$2000), participants made six choices for each of seven delays (1 week, 1 month, 3 months, 6 
months, 1 year, 3 years, and 10 years) presented in random order.  For both the $100 and 
$2000 conditions, the amount of the immediate reward judged equal in subjective value to the 
delayed reward was determined at each delay using an iterative, adjusting-amount procedure 
analogous to that used in the probabilistic discounting task.  Participants were told that the task 
involved assessing preferences and that there were no correct or incorrect choices.   
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Figure 2.2.   A sample trial from the intertemporal choice task. Participants were presented with 
two hypothetical rewards and indicated their decision between the smaller immediate reward 
and the larger reward to be received at the same delay.   
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I randomized the order in which participants completed the risky decision-making task 
and the intertemporal choice task.   All of the rewards in this study were hypothetical, which 
raises the question of whether decisions would be made differently if rewards were real.  
Numerous studies have directly investigated this question by comparing hypothetical versus 
real rewards in financial decision making.  These studies find no systematic difference in 
respective discount rates for delay discounting (Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Lagorio & Madden, 
2005; Locey, Jones, & Rachlin, 2011; Madden, Begotka, Raiff, & Kastern, 2003; Madden et al, 
2004) or probabilistic discounting (Hinvest & Anderson, 2010).  Further, one fMRI study found 
that evaluating real and hypothetical rewards activated the same brain regions and that the 
BOLD signals in these regions were indistinguishable by function of reward type (Bickel, Pitcock, 
Yi, & Angtuaco, 2009).  The use of hypothetical rewards in discounting research is thus likely to 
be valid and generalizable to real monetary rewards.  
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2.3 Results  
 
Risky decision-making. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the mean subjective values of the sure 
rewards for amnesic cases and controls plotted as a function of risk for $250 and $2,000 
rewards, respectively.  As may be seen, the amnesic individuals (like the controls) exhibited 
clear discounting of both the $250 and $2,000 certain rewards: In each case, the subjective 
value that the amnesic individuals placed on a reward decreased systematically as the odds 
against receiving the reward increased.  
I then calculated participants’ area under the curve (AuC) for each sure reward amount.  
The AuC measure represents the area under the observed subjective values and provides a 
single, theoretically neutral measure of the degree of discounting (Myerson, Green, & 
Warusawitharana, 2001).  Both subjective value and risk were normalized in order to calculate the 
AuC that, as a result, can range between 0.0 (maximally steep discounting) and 1.0 (no 
discounting). I then applied the neuropsychological approach to participants’ AuCs to estimate 
the degree to which their discounting differed from that of controls (Table 2.1).  Results show 
that each amnesic case’s AuC was within normal range. In other words, amnesic cases show 
normally sensitivity to risk.
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Figure 2.3 Subjective value of a $250 reward as a function of risk.
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Figure 2.4 Subjective value of a $2,000 reward as a function of risk. 
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Table 2.1 Amnesic cases’ risky decision-making 
 
 
 $250 reward $2,000 reward  
 
 
Case  z-score  %ile rank  descriptive label z-score  %ile rank  descriptive label 
 
KC  -0.385 34th – 37th  Average -0.078 47th    Average 
DA 1.068 86th  High average 0.538 70th – 73rd    Average 
DG  -0.144  45th    Average  0.226  58th – 61st  Average 
LD -0.240  39th – 42nd  Average   -0.035 47th – 50th  Average 
BL  0.819 79th  Average  -0.116 42nd – 45th      Average   
SN  -0.413 34th    Average  -0.307 37th -39th    Average  
     
 
Higher scores indicate riskier decision-making.  
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Intertemporal choice.  Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the mean subjective values of the 
delayed rewards for amnesic cases and controls plotted as a function of delay for $100 and 
$2,000 rewards, respectively. As can be seen, the amnesic individuals (like the controls) 
exhibited clear discounting of both the $100 and $2,000 future rewards: In each case, the 
subjective value that the amnesic individuals placed on a reward decreased systematically as 
the delay until receiving the reward increased.  
I then calculated participants’ AuC for each future reward amount and applied the 
neuropsychological approach to estimate the degree to which amnesic cases’ discounting 
differed from that of controls (Table 2.2).  Results show that each amnesic case’s AuC was 
within normal range. In other words, amnesic cases show normally valuation of the future.
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Figure 2.5 Subjective values of a $100 reward as a function of delay.  
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Figure 2.6 Subjective values of a $2000 reward as a function of delay.  
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Table 2.2 Amnesic cases’ intertemporal choices 
 
 
 $100 reward $2,000 reward  
 
 
Case  z-score  %ile rank  descriptive label z-score  %ile rank  descriptive label 
 
KC  0.024 50th  Average 0.335 63rd    Average 
DA 0.841 79th – 81st   High average 0.181 55th – 58th  Average 
DG  -0.313 37th – 39th    Average  -0.550  27th – 30th   Average 
LD -0.567  27th – 30th    Average   0.692 75th – 77th      High average 
BL  -0.001 50th  Average  -0.081 53rd     Average 
SN  -0.655 25th – 27th    Average  -0.353 34th – 37th    Average 
     
 
Higher scores indicate shallower discounting. 
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 Post-task interviewing.  Because intertemporal choice involves explicit consideration of 
the future, I conducted an informal post-task interview to understand how amnesic individuals 
made choices during this task.  D. A. reported using a strictly economic strategy, specifically 
estimating inflation and interest rates, but did not expand on how he made his calculations. 
This strategy capitalized on his premorbid professional background.  When probed, D. A. gave 
vague and general examples of how he might spend the money, such as “going on a vacation.” 
D. G. simply reported “wondering if [he] could wait that long” when deciding between 
immediate and delayed rewards. When pressed further, he reported that his decisions were 
based on a “gut feeling.” Likewise, B.L., S.N., and K.C. also reported relying on a “gut feeling.” K. 
C. was unable to imagine episodes or ways in which he might spend the hypothetical payout; 
when probed, K. C. consistently stated that he supposed he would “put it in the bank.” In fact, 
none of the amnesic cases reported spontaneously engaging in episodic considerations for 
spending. Though (aside from D.A.) amnesics’ decision-making strategies were vague at best, 
each was able to take the future into systematic consideration for their economic choices.  
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2.4 Conclusion 
 
 
Given that episodic (re)constructive abilities are impaired in individuals with 
hippocampal amnesia (Experiment 1), I tested amnesic individuals on tasks that reflect future 
consideration but that do not necessarily involve the (re)construction of events from one’s 
remembered past or in one’s imagined future. The objective was to determine whether there 
are functionally dissociable forms of prospective thinking, some of which may depend on 
hippocampal episodic memory, and some of which may not.  Six amnesic cases with impaired 
episodic prospection completed a risky decision-making task involving monetary rewards, 
varying the likelihood of their receipt.  Despite the potential for those with impairments in 
prospection to be risk-prone, all cases systematically discounted the value of probabilistic 
monetary rewards as the odds against their receipt increased, performing within the range of 
their respective controls. The same cases also performed an intertemporal choice task, varying 
the delay until reward receipt.  Amnesic cases again performed within the range of healthy 
controls, systematically discounting the value of future monetary rewards as the delay until 
their receipt increased.    Taken together, these findings demonstrate that decisional aspects of 
prospection that do not require episodic construction are spared in those with extensive 
hippocampal damage and despite deficits in episodic prospection. 
The current findings indicate a need to fractionate prospection into distinct underlying 
parts in order to understand the (potentially limited) role that the hippocampus occupies. In 
those with hippocampal damage, I propose that the crux of the deficit is in basic, constructive 
processes in the retrieval and binding of details, which are common to episodic memory, future 
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imagining, and imagining in general.  It may also be that the well-established dissociations 
between semantic and episodic elements in memory are true of prospection (Klein et al., 2002). 
Notably, the discounting tasks used in the current study, and on which people with 
hippocampal damage showed apparently normal function, capture predominately semantically 
mediated aspects of future thought. Thus, these findings support Klein et al.’s (2002) assertion 
that semantic memory alone can support a host of future-thinking abilities so long as they do 
not require temporal awareness of one’s own experience.  Klein et al. (2002)’s report, and the 
collective results from the dissertation thus far, indicate that prospection is not a unitary 
construct.  There is emerging evidence that MTL and frontal lobe regions make distinct 
contributions to forms of prospective thinking.   MTL structures and the hippocampus in 
particular, appear to occupy a central role in atemporal aspects of prospection such as those 
mentioned in the Introduction. In contrast, medial prefrontal cortex appears to be selectively 
important for subjective, conscious, experiential aspects of future thinking, and time-based 
thought in general (e.g., Fellows & Farrah, 2005; Wheeler et al., 1997; Nyberg et al., 2010).  
Recent fMRI studies demonstrate that hippocampally-mediated episodic prospection 
occupies a role in financial decision making (Peters & Büchel, 2010; Benoit, Gilbert, & Burgess, 
2011) but it is unclear whether this role is necessary or merely modulatory; the current findings 
suggest the latter. Further, the fact that I found no significant difference in delay or probability 
discounting between amnesic individuals and healthy controls indicates that such modulatory 
effects are relatively slight. The apparent discrepancy between the current data and studies 
that show an effect of prospection on decision making support a multiple systems approach to 
decision making.  In a multiple systems approach, automatic and controlled processes can work 
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in tandem to produce a decision (see Sanfey & Chang, 2008; Johnson & Weber, 2009 for 
reviews).  There are likely multiple concurrent mechanisms that enable intertemporal choice 
and episodic prospection may be just one of several such mechanisms.   
This approach explains why the current findings and those implicating a role for the 
hippocampus in discounting (i.e., Peters & Büchel) are not mutually exclusive.  Amnesic 
individuals’ intact performance on the present tests does not rule out the possibility that 
distortions in their temporal experience (i.e., impaired episodic prospection) could have more 
subtle effects on their decision-making.   It remains an open question whether experimental 
manipulations of episodic prospection would have the same attenuating impact on the amnesic 
cases’ discounting as they have on that of healthy adults.   
Other questions that arise from this study include: What subjective strategies are reported 
by amnesic individuals? Do the strategies reported differ systematically from those reported by 
controls? The post-task interview in this study was informal because it was not part of the 
original task; only partway through data collection did it become apparent that the approaches 
to the task taken by individual participants were highly variable. A follow-up study that includes 
a formal post-task interview would help clarify individual differences in decision-making 
strategies and determine if subjective reports inform behavioural results.   
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Experiment 3 
 
Flexible Intertemporal Choice  
 
3.1 Introduction  
Results thus far show that amnesic cases with hippocampal damage have impaired 
episodic (re)construction (Experiment 1) yet their decisions do not reflect a lost future:  they 
avoid risky choices as much as controls and they value the future systematically when deciding 
among delayed rewards (Experiment 2).    
It is unclear how to reconcile amnesic cases’ apparently normal rates of delay 
discounting with the hippocampus’ purported role in general decision-making (Ernst et al., 
2002; Gupta et al., 2009) and particularly in intertemporal choice (Cheung & Cardinal, 2005; 
McHugh, Campbell, Taylor, Rawlins, & Bannerman 2008; Kurth‐Nelson, Bickel, & Redish, 2012). 
One possibility is that amnesic populations have nuanced decision-making impairments not 
readily detected in standard measures of intertemporal choice.  Specifically, their decision-
making may lack adaptive flexibility.  Flexible decisions are responsive to new information, are 
modulated by environmental cues, and are constructed in real time when presented with 
choice (Fellows, 2006).  Although the ability to bend and shift choices is broadly associated with 
frontal lobe function (Fellows, 2006; Mitchell et al, 2009), researchers now posit that the 
hippocampus and episodic prospection also contribute to this hallmark of human decision-
making (see Johnson, van der Meer, & Redish, 2007; Labudda et al., 2009).  
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In Experiment 2, amnesic cases may have made seemingly normal intertemporal choices 
using a rigid, non-episodic heuristic such as rejecting every offer below a certain threshold.  One 
way to further investigate the normalcy and limits of decision-making in amnesia is to test 
whether, like healthy controls, individuals with damage to the MTL memory system and 
impairments retain adaptive flexibility in their decision-making.  For example, healthy 
individuals flexibly modulate their delay discounting (i.e., place greater value on the future) 
when they are first cued to imagine specific future experiences temporally contiguous with the 
reward. fMRI analyses show that this cueing effect is predicted from both the amount of self-
reported mental imagery during decision-making and the degree of coupling between 
hippocampal/MTL and frontal lobe regions (Peters and Büchel, 2010; Benoit et al., 2011). These 
findings suggest that individuals with damage to these systems, or reduced coupling among 
them, will not be able to modulate the value of future rewards when they are cued to think of 
personal future experiences.  
The current study tests the hypothesis that hippocampal amnesia impairs prospective 
decision-making disabling the cueing effect – that is, flexible modulation toward the future 
when cued to imagine future experiences.  Does this modulatory effect require intact episodic 
prospection, or can alternative mechanisms facilitate the adaptive effect of cueing without 
detailed episodic prospection? 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
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Amnesic cases. The same amnesic cases who participated in Experiments 1 and 2 
participated in the current study. Participants again received monetary compensation for their 
time. 
 Controls.  The same controls who participated in Experiment 2 participated in the 
current study.     
Participants gave informed written consent in accordance with the Human Research 
Ethics Committees of York University and Baycrest, and received monetary compensation for 
their time. 
3.2.2 Procedure 
 At least one month after participants completed the standard intertemporal choice task 
in Experiment 2, they performed a second intertemporal choice task that included personal 
future event cues.   Although carry-over effects from this design cannot be ruled out, our 
previous research shows that they are unlikely: repeated testing does not systematically change 
rates of discounting in amnesic cases or controls (Kwan, Craver, Green, Myerson, Boyer, & 
Rosenbaum,  2012).  This design also ensured that any benefit from future event cueing did not 
carry over into participants’ baseline discounting rates. 
Amnesic and control participants identified planned or plausible personal future events 
(e.g., appointments, anniversaries, outings) for each of the seven delays in the discounting task.  
To minimize the possibility of inducing anticipatory anxiety or distress, participants were asked 
to include only emotionally neutral or positive future events.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
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amnesic cases had greater difficulty generating events in comparison to controls, and for this 
reason, all participants were permitted to refer to personal calendars and electronic devices, 
which greatly facilitated cue collection. When participants encountered difficulties providing an 
event, the experimenter probed with the following questions:  “Might there be any events with 
family or friends that may take place in <insert delay>?” and, “Is there something you could 
possibly see yourself doing in <insert delay> or want to do in <insert delay>?”  In the case of 
S.N., his mother provided several distant future events when he was unable to provide cues.  
As depicted in Figure 3.1, the discounting task in the cued condition proceeded as in the 
standard (non-cued) condition, except that each delay-interval block was preceded by the 
prospective cue associated with that delay.  Upon viewing a cue word, participants were 
instructed to imagine in as much detail as possible the personal future event associated with 
the cue and to press a button indicating they had the event in mind.  The button press triggered 
the decision-making screen and participants then completed the same intertemporal choice 
task as in the baseline condition.  The event cue remained at the top of the screen until the end 
of the delay block to keep the future event ‘activated’ in participants’ minds and to reduce 
demands on memory.  
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Figure 3.1 A sample trial from the cued intertemporal choice task. Participants were presented 
with an episodic cue and imagined a personal future experience occurring at a specific delay 
(e.g., 3 years).  They were then presented with two hypothetical rewards and indicated their 
decision between the smaller immediate reward and the larger reward to be received at the 
same delay.   
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3.3 Results 
 
Figure 3.2 shows participants’ mean subjective values plotted as a function of delay for 
the standard and cued conditions.  Subjective values are given as proportions of the reward 
amount, averaged across the two delayed amount conditions.  Note that the control data from 
replicates the cueing effect (Peters & Büchel 2010; Benoit et al., 2011): Future rewards were 
discounted less steeply in the cued condition. As may be seen in Figure 3.2, a few of the 
amnesic cases, most notably D.G. and B.L., also demonstrated this effect.   
Next I calculated AuCs for each reward amount ($100, $2000) and for each condition 
(standard, cued).  To measure the cueing effect for each reward amount, I took the difference 
scores between AuCs in the cued condition and those in the standard condition.  I then 
averaged these difference scores across the two reward amounts to derive a single measure of 
the cueing effect (see Table 3.1).  Contrary to my hypothesis, the current results establish that 
cases with low or even outright impaired episodic prospection can show cueing effects that fall 
within the range of controls.  
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Figure 3.2 Subjective value as a function of delay. Lines represent choices averaged across both reward 
amounts. 
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Table 3. 1 Amnesic Cases’ Cueing Effect 
          
                                        Average Cueing Effect 
              ___________________________________________ 
Case  z-score  %ile rank  Descriptive label 
 
KC   -1.76    5th  Borderline impaired 
DA   -0.93 18th  Low average 
DG    0.66             73rd - 75th                   High average - Average 
LD   -0.49   30th - 32nd  Average 
BL    1.20 88th - 90th                   High average 
SN   -0.59            27th - 30th  Average 
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
The present results shed light on the limited contributions that the hippocampus and 
the extended hippocampal system, which support episodic memory and episodic prospection, 
make to intertemporal choice.  Experiment 2 established that hippocampal damage does not 
impair standard intertemporal choice: Individuals with such damage discount the value of 
delayed rewards no more steeply than do healthy controls.  The current study extends this 
research by investigating whether damage to the hippocampal memory system affects the 
tendency for cueing future experiences to modulate the value of future rewards.  
The amnesic group and controls performed an intertemporal choice task with cues that 
prompted participants to imagine personal future events expected to occur at the time the 
delayed reward would be received.   The amnesic cases’ choices in the cued task condition were 
also surprisingly similar to those of controls, indicating broadly preserved ability to reduce the 
degree of discounting when first cued to consider future experiences.  Indeed, low episodic 
prospection (z-scores between -2.00 to -0.74) or even outright impaired episodic prospection 
(z-scores below -2.00) did not completely remove the cueing effect.  These results call into 
question a simple account that assumes a direct relation between episodic prospection and the 
modulation of delay discounting and suggests the need for a more nuanced account.   Not only 
do amnesic cases’ decision-making show preserved regard for the future, their choices can 
remain flexible and responsive to environmental cues.  Their preserved function is likely 
achieved through gist or semantic representations of possible personal future events, and 
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raises the possibility that such representations, rather than or in addition to episodic 
prospection, underlie typical human intertemporal choice.  
Amnesic cases individuals varied widely in both the magnitude of episodic prospection 
impairment (Experiment 1) and the magnitude of cueing effects (current experiment), but 
variability in the former did not predict the latter, raising the question of what other factors 
may account for variations in the cueing effect among amnesic cases.  One factor affecting the 
effectiveness of cueing may be the extent of damage within the extended hippocampal system 
that includes the hippocampus proper and surrounding MTL tissue, as well as the fornix, 
mammillary bodies, and parts of the thalamus (Aggleton & Brown, 1999).  Individual analyses 
revealed that the two individuals who were least responsive to cueing, K.C. and D.A., are those 
with the most widespread and bilateral neurological damage within the MTL.  On the other end 
of the spectrum, the two cases who were most responsive to cueing, D.G. and B.L., are the only 
cases who suffered anoxia, an etiology that can produce more circumscribed, incomplete 
hippocampal lesions (Cummings, Tomiyasu,, Read, & Benson, 1984; Allen, Tranel, Bruss, & 
Damasio 2006) with relative sparing of surrounding MTL tissue. Indeed, B.L.’s lesions are 
selective to the dentate gyrus of the hippocampus and he has spared surrounding MTL tissue.  
Unfortunately, I am unable to assess D.G.’s lesions due to contraindications that prevent him 
from entering an MRI. 
Those with more circumscribed damage may have residual hippocampal tissue that 
remains functional.  In other studies, researchers proposed that activation of residual tissue 
may explain why some amnesic cases nevertheless retain certain functions thought to be 
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hippocampally dependent (Maguire, Vargha-Khadem, & Hassabis, 2010; Mullally, Hassabis, & 
Maguire, 2012).  Follow-up fMRI research with the present sample of amnesic cases to assess 
the functional status of their remaining hippocampal tissue would give additional insight into 
neurological processes that might explain how their intertemporal decision-making is similar or 
dissimilar to that of controls.   
  There is, however, an alternative explanation for why the amnesic cases varied in their 
degree of responsiveness to cueing that is independent of explanations relating to residual 
hippocampal activation, integrity of the extended hippocampal system, and episodic 
prospection. Intertemporal choice is inherently high in individual variability, even among 
healthy adults (Myerson & Green, 1995; Peters & Büchel, 2011), and the cueing effect is also 
likely subject to this variability.  Indeed, the controls in this study show an overall discounting 
reduction in cued choices when scores are averaged, yet the current analyses show that 
individuals varied widely in this regard.  A few control participants even shifted their cued 
choices in the opposite direction, discounting delayed rewards more, rather than less steeply.  
It is thus not surprising, and actually expected, that the amnesic cases would show cueing 
effects of varying magnitudes.  What is surprising, and possibly of fundamental theoretical 
significance, is that the cueing effect was not altogether abolished despite these individuals’ 
neurological damage and memory impairment. 
In a recent study Palombo et al. (2015a) reported that although amnesic cases with MTL 
lesions showed intact standard discounting, they failed to attenuate their discounting in 
response to episodic prospection cues. This latter result differs from what was observed in the 
current study, despite the fact that the amnesic groups in both studies were similar in age, 
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neuropsychological profile, and episodic prospection impairment.  If multiple processes beyond 
episodic prospection can facilitate the cueing effect, it is not immediately clear why the amnesic 
cases in Palombo et al.’s study did not benefit from cueing. One possibility is that the 
discrepancy in findings may be due to differences in how each study cued the personal future.  
Following Benoit et al.’s paradigm (2011), the participants in Palombo et al.’s study were 
probed to imagine future events using cues drawn from a set of standard scenarios (e.g., 
attending a street fair or going to a bar).  Each participant received cues that corresponded to 
events for which they had given ratings of high familiarity and liking in a pre-experimental 
session, and was instructed to imagine spending a specific amount of money in the given 
scenario.  In contrast, participants in the current study generated their own future event cues, 
sometimes referring to existing future plans, and they were not required to imagine doing 
anything specific.   
Because cues in this study were self-generated, personally meaningful, and highly 
plausible for each individual, they may have more readily recruited alternate cue-facilitating 
processes such as gist representation or personal semantic prospection than the standard 
event cues used in Palombo et al. (2015a).  Indeed, it is possible that amnesic individuals in 
general would show benefits in episodic prospection if given specific personalized and 
meaningful future event cues like the ones used in the cued discounting condition of the 
current study, rather than the individual cue words that are typically used to assess episodic 
prospection (i.e., Galton-Crovitz cueing).  Moreover, because the cueing instruction in the 
present study was quite broad (e.g., “Imagine your granddaughter’s birthday party in 1 
month”), it may have facilitated activation of relatively intact gist-like, semantic 
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representations. In contrast, the specificity with which amnesic cases were instructed to 
imagine the future in Palombo et al.’s study (e.g., “Imagine spending $42 at a theatre in 2 
months”) may have loaded more heavily on their impaired episodic prospection ability (see 
Palombo et al., 2015b for commentary). Further research will be needed to identify the 
conditions in which individuals with episodic amnesia show preserved versus impaired decision-
making and to clarify the processes contributing to future decision-making in general.   
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Experiment 4 
Scaffolding Episodic Memory and Episodic Prospection 
 
4.1  Introduction  
Results thus far show that amnesic cases with hippocampal damage have impaired 
episodic (re)construction (Experiment 1) yet they retain intact future oriented decision-making 
(Experiment 2) and in some cases even retain flexible and adaptive responsiveness to cues of 
future experiences (Experiment 3).  The results collectively distinguish basic constructive 
processes in episodic thinking that are impaired in MTL amnesia from other forms of 
prospective thinking that are relatively intact in the same amnesic cases.  In the present 
experiment I reconsider original assessments of memory and prospection in amnesic cases (i.e. 
Experiment 1).  I investigate whether magnitudes of impairment may in part be a function of 
using Galton Crovitz cueing as the method of assessment and whether more structured or 
ecologically valid cues can act as a cognitive scaffold to improve episodic memory and 
prospection impairments in individuals with amnesia.     
There is considerable work in the autobiographical memory literature demonstrating 
that the different aspects of recollection depend on the cue used to elicit a memory.  For 
example, the Proust phenomenon asserts that olfactory stimuli are more effective in eliciting 
memories than stimuli presented via any other sensory modality (see Chu & Downes, 2000, 
2002); moreover, such memories are particularly emotional in nature (Herz, Eliassen, Beland, & 
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Souza, 2004; Willander & Larsson, 2007) and more strongly evoke the subjective experience of 
being “brought back” to the event (Herz & Schooler, 2002).  The ease with which a cue can elicit 
an image – a quality sometimes referred to as imageability – also has implications for the 
process of autobiographical memory retrieval and the content that is retrieved.  Rubin & 
Schulkind (1997) found that cues that are more concrete and imageable elicited 
autobiographical memories with shorter latencies and older autobiographical memories.  
Williams, Healy, and Ellis (2010) manipulated three characteristics of verbal cues – imageability, 
frequency, and predictability – and found that visual imageability uniquely predicted how well 
participants could recollect autobiographical events.   
Galton-Crovitz cueing (Crovitz & Schiffman, 1974), in which participants are given a 
single, generic cue word (e.g., “lemon”) as a starting point for an episode, is widely used to  
elicit narratives in neuropsychological studies of episodic past, and more recently, future 
thinking (amnesia, Race et al., 2011; bipolar disorder, King et al., 2011; amnestic mild cognitive 
impairment, Gamboz et al., 2010; Parkinson’s disease, de Vito et al., 2012; post-traumatic stress 
disorder, Brown, Root, Romano, Chang, Bryant, & Hirst, 2013, etc.).  This method prevails in 
popularity for several reasons.  First, it is a long-standing method for cueing autobiographical 
memories (Galton, 1879; see McDermott, Szpunar, & Christ, 2009), and the overlap between 
episodic memory and prospective imagining makes it an obvious option for cueing prospection.  
Second, it is relatively easy to construct and administer, with the same cue words applied 
uniformly to each participant. Third, cue words can be matched on variables such as 
imageability and frequency of use, allowing for better experimental stimulus control.  
Galton-Crovitz cueing also has methodological drawbacks. For example, Maguire and 
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Hassabis (2011) suggested that individual cue words can elicit semantic bias and erroneously 
inflate amnesics’ episodic prospection scores, thereby masking potential deficits. They also 
proposed that cueing with full sentence descriptors is more valid because it encourages rich 
prospective visualization, which they argue is the foundation of any imagined episode (Hassabis 
& Maguire, 2007). In contrast, Hurley et al. (2011) suggested that constructing a detailed 
representation of a future experience from a single word places high cognitive demands on 
neuropsychological populations and may, instead, result in overestimating the magnitude of a 
participant’s actual impairment. Rosenbaum and colleagues made a similar point based on 
discrepant episodic memory findings in H.C., a rare case of developmental amnesia (see 
Rosenbaum et al., 2014 for detailed neuroanatomical profile). H.C.’s episodic memory was 
impaired when assessed with single Galton-Crovitz cue words (Kwan et al., 2010), yet appeared 
to improve when she was provided with a list of event topics (e.g., high school graduation) from 
which to choose cues (Rosenbaum et al., 2011).  Rosenbaum et al. (2011) suggested that H.C.’s 
greater difficulty with single cue words might have been due to the constraints placed on her 
memory search.  
As with studies of episodic memory, there are variations in the types of cues that 
researchers have used to elicit future events. These differences have led to debate over how 
best to measure the construct and interpret discrepant results across studies (Klein, 2013b; 
Schacter, Addis, Hassabis, Martin, Spreng, & Szpunar, 2012). Nevertheless, systematic research 
on how such differences may affect performance is only beginning to surface (Rasmussen & 
Berntsen, 2014).   
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The main objective of the present study is to test whether specific, personally 
meaningful cues can yield richer episodic memory and prospection in amnesic individuals over 
typically used single Galton-Crovtiz cue words.  The secondary objective is to capitalize on the 
series-of-case studies approach in order to investigate the degree to which each individual 
amnesic case benefits from cueing, along with the factors that lead to cue-related gains in a 
given case.  
 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Participants  
Amnesic cases.  With the exception of amnesic case K.C., the same cases who 
participated in Experiments 1-3 also participated in this study.    
Controls. Control data for episodic prospection using Galton-Crovitz cueing were the 
same as in Experiment 1.  For the current study I tested a separate sample of older adults (N = 
30, 16 male; Mage = 68.233, SD = 6.027). Participants gave informed written consent in 
accordance with the Human Research Ethics Committees of York University and Baycrest, and 
received monetary compensation for their time. 
4.2.2 Procedure 
Approximately one year after completing Experiment 1, each amnesic case returned to 
complete the current study. The amnesic cases could not recall the contents of the first test 
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session, or even of having previously participated. I also tested a new group of healthy older 
controls.  Before beginning the task, amnesic and control participants first identified six past 
personal events (up to five years ago) and six planned or plausible future personal events (up to 
five years in the future). Examples of events included specific appointments, anniversaries, and 
outings.   During the cue collection phase, participants identified the event with a brief tag (e.g., 
“40th wedding anniversary”) and did not elaborate on the event. 
The amnesic cases had greater difficulty than controls in generating topics, and all 
participants were permitted to refer to personal calendars and electronic devices, which 
assisted the cue collection. When participants encountered any difficulty providing an event, I 
probed with the following questions: “Might there be any events with family or friends that 
took place/may take place in <insert delay>?” and, “Is there something you possibly did/could 
see yourself doing in <insert delay>?” In the case of S.N., his mother provided several possible 
future events when he was unable to provide cues. The experimental task and scoring then 
followed exactly the same procedure as in Experiment 1. 
4.3 Results 
Episodic memory.  Figure 4.1 shows the performance of each amnesic case in response 
to specific, personal cues relative to Galton Crovitz cues.  Autobiographical episodic memory 
benefited from personal cueing in some but not all of the cases.  Three of five amnesic cases 
(D.G., L.D., B.L.) showed improved internal detail generation in response to personal cues, 
whereas two of the cases (D.A. and S.N.) did not show an appreciable change in internal detail 
generation across cue type.  Specific cueing did not have any consistent effect on the amnesic 
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cases’ external detail generation during autobiographical recollection. These findings are 
summarized in Table 4.1, which includes z-scores, estimated percentiles, and diagnostic labels 
corresponding to the number of internal and external details of future events that was 
generated by each amnesic case. 
Episodic prospection.  Figure 4.2 shows the performance of each amnesic case’s 
performance on episodic prospection in response to specific, personal cues relative to Galton 
Crovitz cues.  As can be seen, the five amnesic cases showed varying degrees of benefit from 
personal cueing.  Episodic prospection impairment in three of the five amnesic cases (L.D., B.L., 
S.N.) was significantly alleviated by personal cues, such that they generated a greater number 
of internal details when given personal cues compared to the number generated in response to 
generic cue words. The number of internal details generated by D.A. and D.G. was significantly 
lower than that of controls for each cue type and did not differ in response to personal cues.  
In contrast, specific cueing had widely variable effects on external detail generation, 
with no clear pattern in external detail generation as a result of personal cueing. These findings 
are summarized in Table 4.2. 
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Figure 4.1 Amnesic cases’ episodic memory using Galton Crovitz cueing and using personal 
specific cueing.  Z-scores are reversed so that higher numbers indicate greater impairment.  
Asterisks denote clinically significant improvement, defined as improvement by at least one 
diagnostic level according to a standardized psychometric conversion table.  
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Table 4.1 Episodic memory with Galton-Crovitz cues and specific, personal cues 
  
Internal details 
 
 Galton-Crovitz cue words+ Personal specific cues 
 
Case  z-score  %ile rank  descriptive label z-score  %ile rank  descriptive label 
 
DA -1.802 3rd – 4th  Borderline -1.715  4th – 5th  Borderline 
DG -3.200  0.07th  Impaired  -2.005  2nd   Impaired – BL* 
LD -2.124  1st – 2nd   Impaired   -0.261 39th – 42nd   Average* 
BL -2.003 2nd    Borderline - Impaired  -0.684 23rd – 25th   Low average – A* 
SN -1.762 3rd – 4th   Borderline  -1.899 3rd   Borderline  
     
External details 
 
 Galton-Crovitz cue words+ Personal specific cues  
 
Case  z-score  %ile rank  descriptive label z-score  %ile rank  descriptive label 
 
DA -0.490 30th -32nd  Average -0.765  21st – 23rd   Low average 
DG -1.724  4th  Borderline   1.164   88th   High average 
LD  0.673 75th   High average  -0.185 42nd – 45th   Average 
BL  1.022 86th  High average   0.316  62nd   Average 
SN         3.117  99.91st   Very superior    2.786 99.7th    Very superior  
 
Higher “External details” scores indicate an access of details.  
BL = Borderline, A = average, “superior” performance indicates an excess of details  
+ Galton-Crovitz data taken from Experiment 1: Episodic Memory and Episodic Prospection  
* indicates significant clinical improvement  
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Figure 4.2 Amnesic cases’ episodic prospection using Galton Crovitz cueing and using personal 
specific cueing.  Z-scores are reversed so that higher numbers indicate greater impairment.  
Asterisks denote clinically significant improvement, defined as improvement across diagnostic 
labels of function in a standardized psychometric conversion table.   
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Table 4.2 Episodic prospection with Galton-Crovitz cues and specific, personal cues 
  
Internal details 
 
 Galton-Crovitz cue words+ Personal specific cues 
 
Case  z-score  %ile rank  descriptive label z-score  %ile rank  descriptive label 
 
DA -1.653 4th -5th  Borderline -1.574  5th – 6th  Borderline 
DG -2.459  0.7th – 0.8th  Impaired  -2.622  0.4th – 0.5th  Impaired 
LD -0.891 18th -19th  Low average  0.308 61st – 63rd  Average* 
BL -1.432 7th – 8th   Borderline  -1.144 12th – 13th  Low average* 
SN -2.074  2nd  Impaired  -1.574 5th – 6th  Borderline* 
     
External details 
 
 Galton-Crovitz cue words+ Personal specific cues  
 
Case  z-score  %ile rank  descriptive label z-score  %ile rank  descriptive label 
 
DA -0.721 19th – 21st   Average – Low average -1.226  10th – 12th  Low average  
DG -1.850  3rd – 4th Borderline  -0.718  23rd – 25th   Low average 
LD  0.404 66th   Average  -0.059 47th – 50th  Average 
BL  1.459 92nd – 93rd    Superior   1.241 88th – 90th   High average 
SN  1.230  88th – 90th   High average           2.653 99.6th   Very superior 
 
 
Higher “External details” scores indicate an access of details.  
“Superior” performance indicates an excess of details 
+ Galton-Crovitz data taken from Experiment 1: Episodic Memory and Episodic Prospection  
* indicates significant clinical improvement  
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4.4 Conclusion  
The present study investigated whether impaired episodic memory and prospection 
improves when specific, personally meaningful cues are provided rather than standard, generic, 
Galton-Crovitz cue words.  I found that personal cues benefited the generation of internal 
details in 3 of the 5 cases, in both past and future conditions.  The current finding that some 
MTL amnesic cases benefit from specific, personally meaningful cues suggests that basic 
constructional processes in episodic memory and prospection may be compromised. This is 
consistent with fMRI studies of episodic prospection that show increased hippocampal 
activation during the initial construction phase of prospection, and subsequently decreased 
activation as participants elaborate on the constructed event (Addis et al., 2007; see also Rabin, 
Gilboa, Stuss, Mar, & Rosenbaum, 2010).  
The role of the hippocampus in initial event construction indicates the importance of 
having some scaffold or framework to help structure event details in at least some individuals 
with hippocampal amnesia. Identifying potential scaffolds is of theoretical and clinical interest.   
For example, a memory schema, defined as an associative network structure based on multiple 
episodes that is adaptive and lacks detail (Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014), may serve as such a scaffold. 
A schematic cue to scaffold episodic prospection might be, “Imagine how you would make 
lemonade in the future,” as this draws on scripted and generic conceptual knowledge on how 
to make lemonade. In contrast, a specific personal cue to scaffold episodic prospection, as in 
the current study, might be, “Imagine your granddaughter’s lemonade sale next summer.” Both 
types of cues likely afford greater episodic (re)construction than the Galton-Crovitz cue 
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equivalent, “lemonade.” Relatedly, Irish and colleagues suggest that semantic memory in 
particular can act as a schema for prospective thinking (i.e., “Semantic Scaffolding Hypothesis,” 
Irish, Addis, Hodges, & Piguet, 2012; Irish & Piguet, 2013), while Klein (2015) suggests that 
autonoetic consciousness, a unique experiential awareness of the self across time, scaffolds the 
ability to travel through mental time into one’s future. Thus, specific personal cues may be just 
one of many ways to scaffold episodic memory and prospection.  
At the same time, results from this study also show that even scaffolding narratives with 
rich cues does not altogether extinguish impairments in memory and prospection.   Such cues 
reduce but do not remove constructive demand and providing a basic structure still requires 
individuals to “fill in the blanks” or elaborate, a process that requires MTL integrity, albeit to a 
lesser degree than initial event construction (Addis & Schacter, 2008).  Indeed, recent 
neuroimaging studies of the neural underpinnings of event construction show that the role of 
the hippocampus may be more nuanced than originally believed. For example, McCormick and 
colleagues (2013) used a multivariate approach to assess functional connectivity between 
hippocampal and neocortical regions as healthy participants constructed and elaborated on 
autobiographical memories.  Results showed that only the left anterior hippocampus was 
activated and that it interacted with frontal areas during the construction phase; bilateral 
posterior hippocampi were activated and interacted with visual perceptual areas during the 
elaboration phase.  Another neuroimaging study suggests that medial temporal lobe structures 
are critical only during the elaboration of autobiographical events when modulated by the PFC. 
Findings from this study instead identified two other networks – a frontoparietal network and a 
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cinguloperculum network – as facilitating the construction of autobiographical recall (St. 
Jacques, Kragel, & Rubin, 2011).   
Delineating the roles of the hippocampus and other regions in episodic memory and 
episodic prospection continues to be an active area of investigation, and the current study may 
inform some discrepancies in findings from past studies on this topic.  For example, patient H.C. 
demonstrated significant episodic prospection impairment when she was first assessed using 
Galton-Crovitz cueing (Kwan et al., 2010). However in subsequent testing using more elaborate, 
full-sentence scenario cues (e.g., “Imagine you are walking along a busy fishing harbor”; 
“Imagine how you will spend next Christmas”), H.C. and other developmental amnesic cases 
with MTL damage showed intact episodic prospection (Cooper et al., 2011; Hurley et al., 2011). 
The current results suggest that H.C.’s impaired episodic prospection on some measures but 
not others is due to differences in the level of scaffolding built into the non-descript cue words 
versus elaborate scene/scenario cues.  
Comparing episodic memory with episodic prospection in the current study provides 
insight into the well-documented neurocognitive overlap between the two processes. Specific, 
personal cues benefited both episodic memory and prospection in three of five cases. I 
expected that amnesic cases who benefited from personal cueing on episodic memory would 
be the same cases who benefited in episodic prospection.  This was true of B.L. and L.D. but not 
D.G, who showed improvement (albeit modest) only for past memories, or S.N., who showed 
improvement only for episodic prospection. These initial findings may speak to individual 
differences in amnesia or may point to distinct subcomponents of the shared core network 
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underlying past and future episodic thought (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009). Further 
research is needed to determine whether episodic memory and prospection are similarly 
influenced by rich cues.  I discuss individual differences more thoroughly in the General 
Discussion. 
The results show that the frequently used Galton-Crovitz cueing paradigm (Crovitz & 
Schiffman, 1974) may be too restrictive and does not promote the level of detail that patients 
are capable of producing. Tasking MTL amnesic individuals with generating detailed episodes 
from non-descript everyday nouns puts them at a particular disadvantage given that 
hippocampal damage impairs a host of related abilities including representational generation 
(Duff, Kurczek, Rubin, Cohen, & Tranel, 2013), generative free-association (Sheldon, Romero, & 
Moscovitch, 2013), detail generation and binding (Rosenbaum et al., 2009), and open-ended 
problem solving (Sheldon, McAndrews, & Moscovitch, 2011).  
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Table 5.1 Summary of amnesic cases’ performance  
 
 
 K.C. D.A. D.G. L.D. B.L. S.N. 
 
Experiment 1 
Episodic memory Impaired Borderline Impaired Impaired B-I Borderline 
Episodic prospection Impaired Borderline Impaired  Low average Borderline  Impaired  
 
Experiment 2 
Intertemporal choice ($100) Average High average Average Average Average Average 
Intertemporal choice ($2,000) Average Average Average High average Average Average  
Risky decision-making ($250) Average High average Average Average Average Average 
Risky decision-making ($2,000) Average Average Average Average Average Average  
 
Experiment 3 
Flexible intertemporal choice Borderline Low average Average – HA Average High average Average 
 
Experiment 4 
Scaffolded episodic memory  -- Borderline B-I Average LA-Average Borderline 
Scaffolded episodic prospection  -- Borderline Impaired Average Low average Borderline 
  
B-I: impaired –borderline impaired; HA: high average; LA: low average
77 
General Discussion 
 
5.1  Summary of experiments 
 
Through a series of experiments I used constructive and non-constructive tasks to 
examine whether people with amnesia are truly “stuck in time”.  In the first experiment I 
examined episodic memory and prospection abilities in a group of etiologically diverse amnesic 
cases using a Galton-Crovitz cueing paradigm.  In Experiment 2 I investigated whether the same 
amnesic cases exhibited disregard for the future by ways of probabilistic discounting in a risky 
decision-making task or steep delay discounting in an intertemporal choice task.  In Experiment 
3 I examined whether amnesic cases retained flexible decision-making by examining whether 
they modulated rates of delay discounting when cued to imagine future experiences.  In 
Experiment 4 I retested amnesic cases’ episodic memory and prospection to examine whether 
minimizing constructive demand in episodic thinking could act as a cognitive scaffold and 
reduce magnitudes of impairment. The overall pattern of results suggests that MTL amnesia 
interferes with basic episodic (re)constructional processes involved in memory and prospection, 
but does not support the notion that such individuals are robbed of time.   
5.2 Comparisons across studies  
 
Neuropsychological research with small samples is particularly vulnerable to the 
skewing that can result from a few or even one extreme case, increasing the likelihood of 
misinterpreting individuals’ actual abilities.  One advantage of treating each case individually 
using an estimates-based approach is that it provides a finer-grained view of individual 
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capacities, facilitating the ability to detect whether and to what degree each case demonstrates 
various impairments.  Table 5.1 summarizes each amnesic cases’ performance on each task in 
this dissertation.  
Gross consistencies across and within individual cases 
Amnesic cases’ performance in Experiments 1 and 2 shows a clear and consistent 
pattern: they have grossly impaired episodic memory and prospection, yet uniformly intact 
decision-making on measures of both risky and intertemporal choice.  Performance in 
Experiment 3 shows that with the exception of K.C., amnesic cases also demonstrate a cueing 
effect within the broadly average range.  Yet for all amnesic cases, Experiment 4 shows that 
improving episodic memory and prospection even with personal, specific cues to scaffold 
narratives proved more challenging than decision-making.   
The finding that performance in Experiment 4 was higher than in Experiment 1, but 
lower than in Experiments 2 and 3 is consistent with the idea that MTL amnesia impairs basic 
narrative processes while leaving a range of prospective decision-making abilities intact.  In 
short, generating narratives is most difficult but can improve with scaffolding cues: decision-
making is unaffected and even retains flexible responsiveness to prospective cues.   
There are also some notable consistencies at the individual case level. For example, D.A. 
resembled other cases with impaired performance in Experiment 1 and intact performance in 
Experiment 2.  In fact for smaller rewards, D.A. demonstrated high average ability to consider 
risk and the future for his decision-making, perhaps reflecting his previous professional 
experience in the field of finance. Yet D.A.’s cognitive abilities appear less malleable than other 
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cases and he had consistent difficulty improving decision-making, episodic memory, and 
episodic prospection.  Specifically, his cueing effect was at the low end of average and personal 
specific cues did not improve his ability to recollect past or imagine future experiences.  One 
reason for this may be due to his response (or lack thereof) to specific cues.  While specific cues 
are generally thought to act as a scaffold to ease the construction process, a comprehensive 
meta-analysis showed that the interaction between cue-specificity and hippocampal 
engagement may be a more nuanced one.  Viard, Desgranges, Eustache, & Piolino (2012) 
conducted a meta-analysis on 58 neuroimaging studies that determined the factors that 
modulated MTL engagement during episodic thinking. They found that specific cues actually 
activated the right anterior hippocampus more than generic cues, arguably because of the 
personally meaningful, individualized nature of the events that specific cues can evoke.  Given 
that D.A. was the only case with predominately right hippocampal damage, perhaps he was 
particularly disadvantaged when given specific cues. 
Likewise, in amnesic case K.C., who had extensive bilateral hippocampal damage, 
specific cues did not have the standard effect on his intertemporal choices, despite him 
showing consistently average standard decision-making in Experiment 2.  Sadly, K.C. passed 
away in 2014, and it is unknown whether narrative scaffolding via personal specific cues would 
have improved his memory and prospection.   
In Experiment 3, I suggest that D.A.’s and K.C.’s relatively low ability to modulate 
intertemporal choice is due to the extent of their neurological damages and here I extend this 
point to also explain D.A.’s lack of improvement in Experiment 4.  D.A. and K.C. have the 
  
85 
 
greatest degree of neurological damage of the amnesic cases in this dissertation.  Unlike other 
cases whose lesions are unilateral and/or relatively circumscribed to the hippocampus, bilateral 
damage in D.A. and K.C. extends beyond the hippocampus into parahippocampal cortices and 
outside the MTL.  Although the hippocampus is the focus of the dissertation, other MTL cortices 
including the parahippocampal gyrus also contribute to episodic memory and prospection 
(Addis et al., 2007; Szpunar, Chan, & McDermott, 2009) and are active during the episodic 
prospection phase of cued discounting (Benoit et al., 2011).  It is thus likely that K.C. and D.A.’s 
extensive neurological injury left these cases with reduced ability to modulate their decision-
making and episodic thinking even relative to other amnesic counterparts.   
K.C. and D.A.’s performance present an important caveat to findings of broadly 
preserved cognitive function in amnesia:  damage occurs along a continuum and severity 
matters.   There may be a point of damage or impairment beyond which manipulations such as 
those in Experiments 3 and 4 have little ability to shift one’s function.   Classification of amnesic 
cases in terms of clinical severity is challenging and somewhat subjective given that severity can 
imply extent of damage within the hippocampus, MTL, and/or beyond as well as degree and 
type of functional memory and/or cognitive impairment. A further complicating factor is that 
severity of neural insult does not always correspond to severity of cognitive deficit. I 
nonetheless believe that it is informative, and at times necessary, to consider clinical cases 
along a continuum of severity, whether in relation to neurological or cognitive compromise, 
which is not always possible at the group level. 
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 On the other end of the performance spectrum are amnesic cases L.D. and B.L.  These 
cases showed not only a cueing effect in Experiment 3, but also made the greatest and most 
consistent cue-related gains in Experiment 4, improving in both episodic memory and episodic 
prospection. Again, severity or, in these cases, lack thereof, may underlie this pattern of 
performance.  Although L.D.’s lesions include the hippocampus as well as parahippocampal 
gyrus, middle temporal gyrus, uncus, and amygdala, they are completely unilateral to the left 
side.  B.L.’s lesions are bilateral, but highly circumscribed to the dentate gyrus of the 
hippocampus with sparing of residual hippocampus and surrounding tissue in the MTL cortices.  
Although formal investigation is needed, the pattern of results in this dissertation suggests the 
following:  what may best facilitate preserved function and successful intervention in 
hippocampal amnesia is not age, general IQ, or recency of injury/illness – L.D. and B.L did not 
have an advantage on any of these variables (see Table 1). Rather, selectivity of neurological 
damage within the MTL may be the most predictive clinical factor.   
 
Nuanced variability within individual cases 
Both D.G. and S.N.’s benefit from personal, specific cues in Experiment 4 was inconsistent 
across episodic memory and episodic prospection.  This intra-individual variability was 
unexpected.   Given the known neurocognitive overlap between these two abilities (Okuda et 
al., 2003; Botzung et al., 2008; see Schacter et al., 2007, and Buckner, 2010 for reviews), I 
anticipated that any cue-related improvement in one temporal end of episodic thinking would 
parallel the other.  Even more surprisingly, D.G. and S.N. showed opposite patterns of benefit: 
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personal, specific cues improved S.N.’s prospection, but not his memory whereas they 
improved D.G.’s episodic memory but not his prospection.  
There are likely multiple reasons why an individual may perform poorly on a task that 
requires generating a narrative of a specific personal event.  For example, those with MTL 
amnesia may be impaired because of disruption to basic constructional processes known to be 
hippocampally dependent (see Maguire et al., 2011; Verfaellie, Race, & Keane, 2012).  
However, impairment can also arise from a breakdown in executive processes: a decline in 
strategic search is argued to underlie prospection impairments Parkinson’s disease (de Vito et 
al., 2012) whereas a decline in the inhibition of off-task speech is argued to underlie 
prospection impairments in normal aging (see Schacter et al., 2013 for review).  In those with 
semantic dementia, a lack of semantic scaffolding is argued to interfere with one’s ability to 
integrate details of a future experience (Irish et al., 2012).  Interestingly, these individuals 
dissociate episodic memory and prospection, demonstrating preserved ability in the former and 
selective impairment in the latter. Given the multitude of processes that contribute to episodic 
memory and prospection, and the finding that the abilities are clinically dissociable, it is not 
altogether surprising that memory and prospection could respond differently to personal 
specific cues.  The pertinent question that D.G. and S.N. collectively raise is, what factors could 
cause one amnesic case to benefit only in memory and another to benefit only in prospection? I 
explore this question by comparing the cases more thoroughly in the following section, with the 
caveat that these are speculative discussion points based only on two cases and that warrant 
systematic investigation.  
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D.G.’s amnesia resulted from an anoxic event secondary to cardiac arrest.  His implantable 
cardiodefibrillator precludes his ability be scanned in MRI; however, D.G. shows the 
characteristic neuropsychological pattern of impairment that typically follows cardiac arrest:  
he has a primary memory impairment with accompanying dysarthric motor deficits (Lim et al., 
2004).  Although his verbal fluency was in the borderline – low average range, this likely reflects 
a motor issue rather than a true executive impairment.  Neither neuropsychological nor 
behavioural observations hint at any executive dysfunction.  He completed all categories on the 
Wisconsin Card Sort Task and shows no behavioural signs of perseveration, disinhibition, or 
marked changes in personality.  
Yet despite otherwise intact cognitive function, the clinical severity of D.G.’s baseline 
memory and prospection impairment is evident and second only to amnesic case K.C. 
(Experiment 1).  D.G.’s localized but severe cognitive impairment in episodic (re)construction 
may explain why, in Experiment 4, he showed cue-related improvement in episodic memory 
but not novel episodic prospection.  This is because novel episodic prospection is generally 
considered the more cognitively demanding than episodic memory, recruiting the hippocampus 
to a greater extent (Köhler et al., 2005; Addis, Cheng, Roberts, & Schacter, 2011).   
An additional possibility is that D.G.’s localized but severe cognitive impairment was 
associated not only with episodic prospection, but also with semantic prospection. While 
overall semantic prospection is believed to be spared in MTL amnesia (Klein et al., 2002), more 
recent research shows that subtle aspects may nevertheless be impaired (Race, Keane, & 
Verfaellie, 2013). If a bank of semantic details can provide the scaffolding for episodic 
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prospection (Irish & Piguet, 2013), perhaps D.G. has both impaired semantic and episodic 
aspects of prospection, making it particularly difficult to construct a novel future experience. 
Since I did not directly assess semantic prospection, continued research with additional amnesic 
cases will allow us to better explore how the extent of neurological damage and/or cognitive 
impairment affects the ability to elaborate on personal episodes after cues reduce the need for 
event construction. 
In contrast to D.G., S.N.’s amnesia appears qualitatively different.   He suffered a thalamic 
stroke which caused bilateral damage to the lateral dorsal thalamus and left pons, and smaller 
lesions in the right pons, right putamen, and left occipital lobe medial to the occipital horn.  He 
has a localized left hippocampal lesion but otherwise intact MTL cortices, fornix, and 
mammillary bodies. Strokes to the lateral dorsal thalamus are rare and its effects on cognition 
are sparsely documented in the literature.  The lateral dorsal thalamus is sometimes considered 
part of the anterior group of thalamic nuclei, functioning in concert to form the limbic thalamic 
nuclei (see Schmahmann, 2003 for review).  Carrera & Bogousslavsky (2006) identified distinct 
patterns of impairment associated with anatomically distinct strokes and found that infarcts to 
the anterior thalamic region were associated with a unique pattern of behaviour that includes 
apathy, amnesia, and perseveration.  This pattern also features speech that is marked by 
disorganization, “the superimposition of unrelated information”, and the “intrusion of themes 
previously discussed”.  This description certainly captures current observations of S.N., as well 
as family reported concerns.  His mother’s primary concerns are his disinhibition, angry 
emotional outbursts, and frequent use of inappropriate language in public settings. More 
recently, he started exhibiting additional perseverative behaviours including hoarding various 
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household items.  S.N.’s neuropsychological data provides further evidence of concurrent 
memory impairment and executive dysfunction.  He is impaired across all memory measures.   
Although his verbal fluency was within the low end of average, he was only able to complete 
three categories on the Wisconsin Card Sort Task while the all of the other amnesic cases in 
Experiment 4 completed all six categories.   
D.G. and S.N.’s differences are apparent even in baseline episodic memory and prospection 
using standard Galton-Crovitz cueing (Experiment 1).  Although they were both impaired in 
both memory and prospection; D.G.’s profile was characterized by an overall paucity of internal 
and external details, likely reflecting the generative deficits associated with MTL (and in 
particular, hippocampal) damage (Rosenbaum et al., 2009).  In contrast, S.N.’s profile was 
characterized by a paucity of internal details coupled with a dramatic elevation in external 
details, likely reflecting concurrent MTL-related deficits in specific detail-generation alongside 
executive deficits in monitoring and inhibition (see Appendix B for samples of prospective 
narratives).   
In summary there is reason– etiological, neuroanatomical, cognitive, and behavioural – to 
believe that D.G. and S.N.’s amnesias are indeed different.  I hold to the interpretation that 
D.G.’s selective cue-related benefit in memory but not prospection is ostensibly due to the 
added difficulty that generating a novel, not-yet-lived experience imposes and the degree to 
which this taxes the hippocampus beyond autobiographical recollection.  The question that 
remains is why S.N. showed selective cue-related improvement only in prospection, or stated 
differently, why he failed to show improvement in memory. Perhaps episodic memory 
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reconstruction requires greater inhibitory control or is more susceptible to task-irrelevant 
speech than constructing a new prospective event.   Future studies can continue to use unique 
neuropsychological cases to parse episodic thinking by respective MTL and frontally-mediated 
processes. 
One rationale for including amnesic cases of varying etiologies and profiles was to observe 
whether degree of memory loss would correspond with the magnitude of any observed 
impairments.  Based on findings of previous studies, the severity of episodic prospection 
impairment was expected to have (1) been consistently greater than severity of episodic 
memory impairment and (2) corresponded with severity of MTL damage. The heterogeneity in 
cognitive impairment and neurological damage across the patients provided an opportunity to 
test these hypotheses.  Instead, findings showed that the amnesic cases’ performance on 
various non-constructive measures of prospection did not appear to correlate with either their 
episodic prospection or extent of hippocampal damage.  This finding bolsters the argument that 
the various measures used here are indeed distinct forms of prospection, not all of which are 
hippocampally dependent.   
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5.3 Neuropsychological case studies inform behavioral economics  
 
Hippocampal-dependent memory has long been studied in cognitive psychology, but its 
application to understanding decision behavior is a relatively new endeavor. The current 
findings provide insight into the strategies and processes underlying widely used economic 
judgment tasks such as delay discounting and probability discounting (i.e., intertemporal choice 
and risky choice measures).  
There are several other theories in the behavioural economics literature that implicate a 
role for mental construction and memory in decision making, although the precise cognitive 
mechanisms are unclear.  For example, preference construction postulates that decisions are 
not made according to pre-determined, rational preferences but rather are constructed at the 
moment of decision. Moreover, the construction of preferences is context-dependent and 
vulnerable to a range of biases (see Slovic, 1995).  An extension of preference construction is 
Query Theory, which argues that people draw on memory processes to construct preferences 
(Weber et al., 2007).  The framing of decision parameters affects the order in which people 
retrieve relevant contents from memory; the order in which people retrieve contents from 
memory ultimately biases their decisions such that initially retrieved contents are weighted 
more heavily.  Amnesic cases are thus useful resources on which to qualify or test assumptions 
of Query Theory.  Given patterns of impaired episodic memory but relatively intact semantic 
memory in hippocampal amnesia, such future studies would give insight into the nature of the 
“memory retrieval processes” (i.e., output interference) that according to Query Theory, 
underlies features of normal decision making (i.e., endowment effects, Johnson, Häubl, & 
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Keinan, 2007; asymmetric discounting, Appelt, Hardisty, & Weber, 2011, Weber, et al., 2007; 
and framing effects, Hardisty, Johnson, & Weber, 2010).   
 This dissertation addresses the fundamental issue of how people choose between 
immediate and delayed rewards.  One mechanism that is frequently assumed to underlie 
intertemporal choice is episodic prospection.  Boyer (2008) proposed that imagining future 
experiences provides a motivational “brake” that steers people away from short-term, 
“myopic” decisions and toward decisions that give more weight to long-term outcomes.  A 
related suggestion regarding the neural mechanism involved is that hippocampally mediated 
representations of decision outcomes evoke anticipatory reward-related activity in downstream 
reward-prediction systems (e.g., basal ganglia; Laurent, 2013).  However, the hypothesized role 
of episodic prospection in making future-oriented choices is called into question by the finding 
that hippocampal amnesic individuals with impaired episodic prospection nevertheless value 
and discount future rewards to the same degree as do healthy controls (Experiment 2, Palombo 
et al., 2015a).   
A related hypothesis is that episodic prospection is needed for flexible future decision-
making.  Thus, although amnesic individuals’ ability to make intact intertemporal choices 
appears to be intact under standard conditions, it is hypothesized that because of their 
impaired episodic prospection, they will not respond as readily to environmental cues such as 
reminders of future experiences.  However, results from Experiment 3 contradict this idea.  
Amnesic individuals’ responsiveness to cueing in this study suggests that their decision-making 
retains a level of adaptive flexibility comparable to that of controls.  This is particularly 
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surprising given that the hippocampus arguably serves a critical role in flexible episodic 
representations in general (see Buckner, 2010; Eichenbaum, Otto, & Cohen, 1994; see also Duff 
et al., 2013; Rubin, Watson, Duff, & Cohen, 2014) and in flexible decision-making in particular 
(Wimmer & Shohamy, 2011).  Although it still is possible that, as Wimmer and Shohamy’s 
(2011) work suggests, the hippocampus contributes critically to decision-making, it may do so 
only under circumstances where decisions build on previously learned associations (Wimmer & 
Shohamy, 2012). 
Multiple processes can facilitate the cueing effect 
Findings from Experiment 3 call into question the possibility that episodic prospection is 
necessary for the cueing effect.  Despite the intuitive appeal of this account, the data suggest 
that episodic prospection is not necessary.  I found no systematic relation between degree of 
episodic prospection impairment and magnitude of the cueing effect. For example, L.D.’s 
episodic prospection score was the highest among the amnesic cases, with his score falling in 
the low average range, yet he demonstrated what is, at best, an average cueing effect.  Further, 
B.L.’s episodic prospection was more impaired than that of L.D., yet B.L. showed a high average 
cueing effect.   
 One possible explanation for the pattern of results observed here is that cueing can 
elicit a gist representation of an imagined future experience via personal semantic memory.  In 
support of this account it should be noted that amnesic cases were able to generate cues of 
future events even with compromised ability to describe the event contents, suggesting that 
their personal semantic prospection might be intact and sufficient to affect decision-making. 
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Moreover, although the amnesic cases’ prospective narratives were relatively impoverished, 
other than K.C., they were not at floor and retained sparse, gist-like content.  In this sense, 
episodic prospection in amnesia mirrors amnesic individuals’ abilities in episodic or spatial 
memories in which detail and specificity are compromised, whereas broad, gist-like 
representations tend to be better preserved (see Rosenbaum et al., 2001; Winocur, 
Moscovitch, & Bontempi, 2010).  Thus, it is possible that presentation of future event cues 
activates gist representations of future experiences that are sufficient to modulate decisions 
regarding the future, even in the absence of detailed event construction.   
The nature of gist representations and its neural underpinnings has become a popular 
area of research. Some studies point to the vmPFC as a principle area associated with gist 
representations, at least for episodic material. In a recent review, Moscovitch, Cabeza, 
Winocur, & Nadel (2016) clearly summarize the process by which recent, detailed episodic 
information might be transformed into gist-like representations:  the posterior hippocampus 
represents detailed spatiotemporal information about recent episodic events, then the anterior 
hippocampus (acting as a bridge between detailed episodic representations and gist) captures 
global aspects of an event, and finally episodic information is transformed into gist 
representations that rely on the vmPFC, along with the anterior temporal lobes.  This 
hypothesis is in part supported through fMRI findings that the vmPFC is active during 
autobiographical recall and its activity is temporally graded; that is, recalling remote memories 
recruits the vmPFC more than recent memories (Bonnici, Chadwick, Lutti, Hassabis, Weiskopf, & 
Maguire, 2012).  Others suggest that the vmPFC supports episodic memory in others ways, for 
example, by providing schemas that are essentially event templates not specific to any 
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particular experience (Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014; Lewis & Durrant, 2011).  Given the current 
amnesic cases’ relatively intact vmPFCs, it is possible that the peripheral aspects of episodic 
thinking that it subserves sufficiently facilitated the cueing effect. 
Recent work on semantic processes in prospection suggests another possible avenue by 
which cueing may reduce discounting. Klein and colleagues note that prospection is actually 
comprised of several distinct components, some of which do not require the MTL.  They 
distinguish between temporal components based on lived time, which is experientially based, 
and known time, which is knowledge-based (see Klein, 2013a).  Others have referred to the 
latter “known” future time as semantic prospection, a type of future-oriented thinking that is 
“…voluntary and not stimulus-bound… and is restricted in that it builds on a knowledge base 
that is impervious to particularities of the learning event itself” (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; 
see Szpunar, Spreng, & Schacter, 2014, for a review).    
The distinction between episodic and semantic prospection in many respects parallels 
the distinction between episodic and semantic memory.  Osvath & Osvath (2008) summarize 
Suddendorf & Corballis’s (2007) conceptualization of semantic versus episodic prospection in 
the following way: “Semantic prospection is rule-based and thereby only sensitive to 
regularities of potential future events, as opposed to the episodic system that by pre-
experience pick out particularities of the possible future events.”  Several recent studies further 
divide time-based episodic thinking into semantic, episodic, and strictly episodic subtypes, 
where only strictly episodic events are unique to a particular time and place, and possess 
associated subjective and phenomenological qualities, such as emotion, details, visual imagery, 
vividness, personal significance and autonoetic consciousness.  In an extensive neuroimaging 
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meta-analysis, authors investigated these three forms of time-based thinking (semantic, 
episodic, and strictly episodic) and found distinct neural correlates underlying each form of 
time based thinking, with strictly episodic events more strongly activating the left posterior 
hippocampus than either episodic or semantic events (Viard et al., 2012)  
These episodic and semantic components of prospection have distinct neural substrates 
(Abraham et al., 2008) but are difficult to disentangle experimentally.  There is, however, one 
neuropsychological case study demonstrating a dissociation between these aspects of 
prospection.  Manning, Denkova, & Unterberger (2013) tested an individual (JR) with temporal 
lobe epilepsy who had significant left (but not right) hippocampal volume loss.  The individual 
underwent a left anteromedial temporal lobectomy that removed the hippocampus, amygdala, 
parahippocampal gyrus and an anterior portion of the middle inferior temporal gyrus and the 
occipito-temporal lateral gyrus.  Experimental post-operative testing showed that JR had 
selectively impaired ability to recall past and imagine future public events while his ability to 
recollect personal past or imagine future personal experiences was preserved.  The researchers 
then ran a follow-up fMRI study with JR, which showed the absence of neural activation for 
impersonal public knowledge and the presence of activity in the autobiographical memory 
network for personally significant public knowledge.  This is the first study demonstrating that 
episodic and semantic components of prospection are indeed dissociable by combining both 
case study and fMRI methods.   
In the currently study, I predicted that at least some of the amnesic cases (particularly 
those with extensive bilateral damage or left, unilateral hippocampal damage) likely also have 
subtle semantic prospection impairments that could have contributed to the apparent degree 
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of their episodic prospection deficit.  However, in the absence of a separate control task 
exclusively measuring semantic prospection, I am unable to assess the magnitude of this 
contribution.   
Among neurologically intact populations, one’s bank of semantic knowledge is thought 
to support episodic simulation of future events by providing the necessary scaffold for 
integrating episodic details (Irish et al., 2012).   Episodic and semantic subcomponents of 
prospection are also presumed to work in concert to facilitate “flexible anticipation,” a term 
Suddendorf & Corballis (2007) use to describe all cognitive operations that represent the 
particularities of a future event.  To illustrate constituent episodic and semantic elements of 
prospection in the context of cueing, consider the following example.  When the cue “40th 
Wedding Anniversary” appears prior to an intertemporal choice trial, a participant may (as 
instructed) simulate a detailed representation of the actual event— he or she may imagine the 
people who will attend, the speeches that will be made, the food that will be served, and the 
feelings of celebration that will be experienced.  This type of detailed episodic prospection is 
usually assumed to underlie the cueing effect: it makes abstract, personal future events 
concrete by representing their spatial, temporal, and emotional features. As a result, episodic 
prospection nudges preferences toward future rewards.   
However, the cue “40th Wedding Anniversary” likely also activates generic schemas or 
scripts involving gifts and celebratory events semantically associated with anniversaries, and 
these might also prompt one to save or plan for such future events. In normal decision-making, 
episodic and semantic components of prospection likely work in tandem when “future 
thinking” influences everyday choices. Yet, as the current example illustrates, (personal) 
 99 
 
      
semantic prospection alone may be sufficient to modulate one’s future-oriented choices 
independent of episodic prospection.   I did not directly assess the status of semantic 
prospection in the amnesic cases tested in the current study, but future studies will help 
determine whether and to what extent it can replace or facilitate episodic prospection during 
future-oriented decision-making.   The idea that multiple processes can facilitate the cueing 
effect is in line with a multiple systems approach to intertemporal choice (Peters & Büchel, 
2011) and to decision-making more generally (Frank, Cohen, & Sanfey, 2009; Kahneman, 2011; 
Sanfey & Chang, 2008; Weber & Lindemann, 2007).   
Multiple systems in decision-making 
Weber and colleagues propose that multiple decision modes co- exist, ranging from 
increasingly affect-based to increasingly analytical (Weber & Lindemann, 2007).  An extension 
of this idea is that decision making may consist of redundant processes and can presumably 
withstand selective compromise of one system, such as with focal brain injury, if other systems 
are preserved.  An application to the current study is that while deliberate, slow, conscious, 
cognitive processes (i.e., episodic future thinking, Kahneman’s System 2) impacts decision 
making, automatic, fast, unconscious, affective processes (i.e., affective reaction to choice 
options, Kahneman’s System 1) can still carry out decision making when System 2 processes are 
impaired.  The current amnesic cases reported a range of strategies that reflect both rapid, 
affective processes (e.g., decisions based on a “gut feeling”) and slow, cognitive processes (e.g., 
decisions based on financial calculations).   
The redundancies that result from having multiple systems may make it possible for 
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intertemporal choice to withstand selective compromise to one of those systems (e.g., impaired 
MTL-mediated episodic prospection) as long as other systems are preserved. Moreover, studies 
of intertemporal choice in healthy individuals provide clues as to what those other preserved 
systems might be.  Both Peters & Büchel (2010) and Benoit et al. (2011) found that the cueing 
effect was associated with increased coupling between activity in the hippocampus and activity 
in regions of medial prefrontal cortex.  The observed coupling with the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) in particular prompted Peters & Büchel to suggest that the ACC dynamically adjusts the 
values assigned to future rewards based on hippocampally represented episodic predictions.  
Further, Benoit et al. found that the medial rostral prefrontal cortex (mrPFC) was involved in 
modulating assigned reward value based on hippocampal representations of imagined future 
episodes.  
 Peters & Büchel (2011) outlined three distinct but interacting systems that may underlie 
intertemporal choice: episodic prospection, which relies on the MTL; valuation, which relies on 
the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC); and cognitive control, which relies on the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC).  Of the three systems, only damage to the valuation system appears to impair 
standard intertemporal choice (Sellitto, et al., 2010).  Thus, individuals with MTL damage can 
make and modulate future-oriented decisions in the absence of detailed hippocampally 
mediated representations via the valuation (OFC) and cognitive control systems (ACC).  Such 
neuropsychological findings illustrate the fact that multiple processes typically are involved in 
decision-making and are consistent with the idea that not all of the systems involved in 
intertemporal choice are necessary for making adaptive future choices 
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5.4 Clinical considerations 
 
Interpreting internal and external details in narratives 
Because internal details are taken as the measure of episodic strength in AI scoring 
(Levine et al., 2002), I expected to find a cue-related increase in internal details if personal 
cueing scaffolds past and prospective narratives relative to Galton-Crovtiz cueing (Experiment 
4).  Although I did not have specific predictions regarding the effect of personal cues on 
external detail generation, it is important to note how internal and external details may 
differentially inform the clinical picture of episodic prospection impairment in a given disorder. 
Patients diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease, amnestic mild cognitive impairment, and healthy 
aging exhibit impaired internal detail generation and elevated external detail generation (de 
Vito et al., 2012; Gamboz et al., 2010; Gaesser, Sacchetti, Addis, & Schacter, 2011, respectively), 
whereas those with post-traumatic stress disorder show selective elevation of external details 
with internal details in the normal range (McKinnon et al., 2014). However, it is not always the 
case that the generation of fewer internal details is accompanied by a greater number of 
external details. For example, individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder and even cases of 
MTL amnesia have been found to produce prospective narratives that are significantly 
impoverished in terms of number of internal details, yet the number of external details 
produced was found to be similar to that of controls (King et al., 2011 and Race et al., 2011, 
respectively).   
A paucity of internal details and increased number of external details may reflect two 
distinct clinical features. Specifically, a low number of internal details may be suggestive of a 
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basic deficit in detail construction and/or binding and may be the source of the episodic 
prospection deficit in MTL amnesia (Rosenbaum et al., 2009; Mullally et al., 2012; Verfaellie et 
al., 2012). In contrast, an abnormally high number of external details may reflect executive 
difficulties involving inhibitory cognitive control, suppression of task-irrelevant thought, or 
sustained attention (McKinnon et al., 2014), or may simply reflect age-related changes in 
narrative style, especially in the case of healthy aging (see Schacter et al., 2012 for discussion). 
As noted, there are conditions in which both low internal and high external detail generation 
co-occur, but distinct patterns among clinical populations suggest that they reflect a 
simultaneous breakdown of dissociable processes.   
In Experiment 1, narratives in response to Galton-Crovitz cues led to highly variable 
external detail generation in the amnesic cases, ranging from borderline impaired (a low 
number of details) to very superior (an elevated number of details). Experiment 4 showed that 
external detail generation was also highly variable in response to personal specific cues, with 
some cases showing reductions in the number of external details generated, others showing 
increases, and still others showing no change. For example, both D.G. and S.N. are impaired in 
both memory and prospection; however, DG’s profile is characterized by an overall paucity of 
internal and external details, likely reflecting the generative deficits associated with MTL and in 
particular, hippocampal damage (Rosenbaum et al., 2009).  In contrast, S.N.’s profile is 
characterized by a paucity of internal details coupled with a dramatic elevation in external 
details.  S.N.’s unique profile likely reflects concurrent MTL-related deficits in specific detail-
generation alongside executive deficits monitoring and inhibition.   
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 Even among controls, external details ranged from an average of 6.25 to 46.25 details 
(SD = 11.38) with Galton Crovitz cue words, and from 6.83 to 40 details (SD = 8.85) with specific 
personal cues. It is unclear why there was such variability in external detail generation. As 
mentioned earlier, one reason may be that external details include any part of the narrative 
that is not central to the imagined episode, including repetitions, editorializing, and even 
attempts at engaging the experimenter in conversation. Taking this into consideration, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the amnesic cases vary so widely in the number of external details 
produced, regardless of cue condition. Some cases complete detail generation within a short 
period of time and speak little during the remaining time, whereas others may switch to an 
unrelated topic or attempt to initiate conversation in order to fill the silence. External details 
can thus reflect overall verbosity or conversation seeking in addition to semantic details.   
In any case, dichotomizing details as either internal or external has limited ability to 
paint a full clinically descriptive picture of amnesic narratives.  Until recently, researchers paid 
little attention to the external details of a narrative and instead focused on internal details (or 
lack thereof) as the main clinical marker of autobiographical memory/prospection impairment. 
Yet in light of recent findings that an excess of external details can predict the onset of post-
traumatic stress disorder (McKinnon et al., 2014), I believe that a shift is underway to better 
explore the clinical significance of elevated external details as a distinct clinical feature. 
Practical clinical implications for goal-setting and rehabilitation  
The current results indicate that assessment and rehabilitation tools for MTL amnesic 
populations should attempt to minimize broad, open-ended questions.  Instead, structured 
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diagnostic tests and compensatory aids may provide the best measurement and later support 
of cognitive ability.  This is particularly important for future planning and future goal setting, 
two common practices for patients in rehabilitation settings. Occupational therapists often use 
open-ended questionnaires that require patients to identify future goals with great detail and 
specificity (e.g., the S.M.A.R.T. method; see Wade, 2009; Bovend'Eerdt, Botell, & Wade, 2009).  
Researchers have attributed patients’ lack of responsiveness during goal setting to low insight 
into one’s own neurocognitive deficits or to low motivation (Fleming, & Strong, 1995; Fischer, 
Gauggel, & Trexler, 2004; Bouwens, Van Heugten, & Verhey, 2009).  In the case of memory 
impaired populations, which span a range of clinical conditions, I offer an additional 
interpretation for why individuals may exhibit low engagement in rehabilitative goal-setting:  
the act of open-ended goal setting taxes existing cognitive deficits in narrative construction.   
Although the hippocampus and memory are classically considered separate from speech and 
language abilities, there is a growing body of research documenting subtle language deficits in 
amnesic populations with hippocampal damage.  This includes decreased flexibility and creative 
use of language (Duff, Hengst, Tranel, & Cohen, 2009), decreased cohesiveness in speech 
(Kurczek & Duff, 2011), and decreased ability to maintain and integrate verbal information even 
over a short duration (Kurczek, Brown-Schmidt, & Duff, 2013).  Thus rather than asking 
unstructured questions such as, “What is a goal for the future?” results from Experiment 4 
provide evidence-based suggestions for creating more effective ways to structure questions for 
memory-impaired populations.  Cues and questions should be specific rather than broad, 
personally meaningful rather than generic, and detailed rather than sparse.  Including a greater 
degree of narrative scaffolding in questions and conversation will provide structure onto which 
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amnesic cases can build concerns and goals.   
Rehabilitative clinicians may consider assistive technology to help amnesic populations 
compensate for deficits in basic processes needed to construct a narrative – generating details, 
holding them in relation to one another, and binding them to produce a cohesively articulated 
thought.   For example, Talking Mats® are symbol-based communication tools that facilitate 
deeper and more effective communication among different populations who exhibit difficulties 
with expressive speech.  This tool greatly minimizes the need to construct, maintain, and relate 
disparate pieces of information for real-time conversation.  Talking Mats® improve the clinical 
goal-setting process (Bornman, & Murphy, 2006) and are shown to effectively facilitate 
communication among those with dementia (Murphy, Gray, & Cox, 2007), Huntington’s disease 
(Ferm, Sahlin, Sundin, & Hartelius, 2010), and among the elderly (Murphy, Tester, Hubbard, 
Downs, & MacDonald, 2005).  Our case-by-case analysis suggests that clinical populations with 
more circumscribed hippocampal / MTL damage or milder episodic memory and/or prospection 
impairment, as occurs in amnestic mild cognitive impairment, may gain the most from these 
compensatory strategies and aids.  In the clinical endeavor to rehabilitate amnesic patients with 
impaired episodic prospection, current results show that framing and scaffolding the question is 
a promising starting point.  
5.5 Concluding remarks 
 
There is a need to reconsider the mental life of individuals with amnesia and whether 
they are indeed, as Oliver Sacks (1985) put it, “…stuck in a constantly changing, meaningless 
moment”.  Drawing from neuropsychology, cognitive neuroscience, and behavioural 
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economics, I demonstrated that time is not the essence of impairment in hippocampal amnesia 
and considering such individuals to be trapped in a moment grossly underestimates their 
preserved abilities.  Although it is true that damage to the hippocampus and within its extended 
system impairs episodic (re)construction, it is equally important to recognize that there are 
other aspects of prospective cognition that are left relatively intact. Amnesic individuals’ 
decision-making provides a window into how they value their futures; through it, we see that 
their choices are not bound to the present. 
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Appendix A 
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Appendix B 
 
Sample prospective narratives 
 
 
 
Cue word: “Stain”  
 
K.C. 
[no details given] 
 
 
D.A. 
Next few weeks, stain. Well stain has two possible meanings of applications, we do have the 
problem occasionally of people coming in out of the pool especially if it was early in the year you 
might come in dripping chlorine but that’s not the problem now the chlorine is burnt off now its 
just the bromine now which doesn’t bleach anything. Um, if you see some of the old carpet, you 
see the drops there on that carpet? That’s from when the pool’s been first open and a wet suit 
or towel dripping a little water and it’s enough chlorine in it that it creates little spots.  
 
[probe]  
 
Um, probably won’t have to worry about that. But what we do have to with our anniversary 
coming up, we might have a party at a restaurant but we will probably be bringing in family and 
friends in here and there’s we’ve replaced the carpet in the family room twice, and that’s usually 
from coffee, tea, or some kind of soft drink spills, so it’s kind of expected that that will possibly 
happen again. 
 
 
D.G. 
Hopefully we get that stain out of the carpet because that’s fairly new (long pause, 
followed by experimenter probe).  If we have to get a new carpet we won’t have much 
money for Christmas. 
 
L.D. 
Um the only thing that I can think of that creates a stain is anything dropped on my 
shirt. Um and that depends on kind of a couple of things. Um one of the areas that I..I 
work out all the time and I’ll go to the gym sometimes and I’ll sweat like a pig. And my if 
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I have a shirt that was really weighed one pound, with by the time I get worked out, it 
would be two pounds at least, if not..it would be soakin wet. And sometimes as you’re 
doing that, um if you don’t wash the shirt right, somehow it just seems to be..there’s a 
line that seems to appear from the salt that’s in your body. And it’s not all the way 
through but it’s on one section and if you don’t wash it right away, um you get that line, 
you get uh I don’t know what you call it..it’s uh..it’s a mark, either dry, looks like it’s 
dried out or a white stain and..and then all of a sudden uh you have a nice shirt that 
looks like hasn’t been clean, hasn’t been washed and you can’t get it out. So that’s 
something that does occur. Um and..and how I get out of it many times is um or how I 
deal with it many times is I’ll bring two shirts. So here I am working out, I’m soakin wet, 
in great shape. I’ve got my heart rate up and everything’s going like you’re supposed to 
go and the shirts soakin wet and I’m thinking ah ha! Now what I’ll do I’m just gonna go 
into the washroom or locker and take this shirt off, I’m gonna throw it in some water, 
put some soap on it and this only takes thirty seconds, rinse it out a little bit, put it back 
in..to a wet spot in the..by the locker and put on a dry shirt and I’m very happy and I’ve 
done that..and that’s how I’m gonna continue doing it when I work out like that. So um 
this..the stain in your shirt is a pain in the butt, believe me. The other that sometimes 
occurs is and I don’t know why this happens sometimes and I think it’s because I’m 
getting older and slowing down. If I had um a pasta dinner or something like that and 
if..ever anything spilled off the sauce, hot sauce spilled off on me, which it can do, guess 
what it causes? It causes a red mark. I was gonna say stain but it doesn’t and that means 
you have to go right away, clean it up, do it and you come back and you’re nice and 
clean but you look like you’ve spilled water all over you cause you’ve cleaned your 
friggen shirt. So one of the things that you know, when I grow older, I hope I can eat 
more properly and..and avoid the stains but sometimes it just happens anyway. Um so 
between the two of those things, those are the only times I get stains on myself, never 
happens and it’s..I have tons of clothes, always look good but all of a sudden it can 
happen and it can happen twice in one week and I’m goin holy smokes, I can’t believe 
this is happening! And I take care of myself, I do everything I’m supposed to do and 
guess what? There’s a stain and if it’s a good shirt opposed to a work out shirt, you can’t 
really use it again. Now do I stain my pants? No. Do I wet my pants? No. I don’t do 
anything else in my pants but those are the only stains I ever have and it’s kind of sad 
kind of funny kind of goofy that all of a sudden you could be eating properly, you could 
be doing you’re supposed to do and something falls off of something and causes a stain 
in your shirt. And so I don’t know what else to say. 
 
 
B.L. 
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Stain, stain, stain..I wish my landlord would stain my deck. Um stain, stain, stain.. 
 
No it’s my landlord’s responsibility and uh I don’t like  <name of landlord>  a lot but the gaps 
bugs <name of landlord> constantly, he’s my landlord. So I guess if I wanna get something done, 
I make it a problem for <name of neighbour> upstairs and then he’ll make it a problem for 
<name of landlord>. I’m not that concerned about it myself. Um I got some..I have some uh 
patio furniture that’s between the shed and the fence. It’s probably gonna make a stain on the 
fence for ever put together or like it adds..it needs a lot of work.  I’m gonna put it on the street 
or take it to the dump before it stains anything. 
[experimenter probe] 
Oh just hauling the stuff out of the backyard…finding somebody with the proper vehicle to take 
it to the dump. Yeah..and then it’s gone. I’m not thinking about putting it together again or 
anything like that..that was my original plan. And uh and when I have the time and the money 
and inclination, I can..I can..I can buy new stuff rather than try to put together this lump of crap 
that was on the side of the road. I kind of get this from my dad cause my dad once got an 
aluminum boat? on the side of the road. And it was fine..he strapped it to the top of his van, 
took it..?and my uncle still has it. It’s called a pick up day in <name of city> a, once a year they 
did a bigger put anything you want garbage day..and uh my dad got a boat once year from my 
uncle and this kind of funny..nothing to do with stains really but I was still will my ex at the time. 
So my mom and dad were out again, and me and <name of former spouse> with <name of 
child> in the car, we were looking. Apparently there’s a statue of Jesus but he’s broke..with 
fingers broken off and uh my parents went out..I didn’t know of this but they wanna pick him up 
and mom said, “Nah, leave it there” so dad left it there. Meanwhile, me and <name of former 
spouse> and <name of child>were out, I saw it and we can’t leave Jesus on the street like that. 
So I brought him back, I put him in the garage, closed the garage, meanwhile mom and dad are 
still out and in the meantime, well me, <name of former spouse>, and <name of child> are still 
out, they came back home and saw two finger Jesus in the garage and mom said she just about 
pooped herself. And now they took it out to <name of other city> and set him on like a cutoff log 
and now there’s a big shrine there. People that built the big..it’s like a big rainbow with French 
words, I forget what they said..I have pictures of it. Dad often this..it’s called two finger Jesus 
because his fingers are broken off eh, it’s terrible.. It’s a true story. I should carry that picture 
around with me cause I tell people that story before and well I think they believe me but it is 
true and it is pretty weird. But yeah, mom said, “You can’t take that”..mm you know. Yeah.. 
[redirection] 
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I will stop feeling guilty about..not guilty..I’m not..I’m not gonna be picking up as much garbage 
off the street unless it’s another two finger Jesus. No, I just like for few years there, especially 
when I first got separated, I was..been to the bank..I was hired up for cash so I would grab 
things I didn’t really need, just something and trying to fix it up and make it good. And 
sometimes I was successful and sometimes I wasn’t. But this time it was just, it was just the last 
time I’m doin’ that. And uh..once I get rid of that..once it’s perfect, still in the box from the store, 
I’ll pick it up from the street. 
 
S.N. 
I’ll guarantee it. I spill a coffee on something. I drink too much of it. I wreck another pair 
of Diesel jeans. $350 dollar jeans, wrecked. Should I show you a picture, or do I show you 
the pair of jeans? Torn knee, Diesel jeans, wrecked. Oh. Um, I’ll stain something. Doesn’t 
matter. Stains, it’s a part of life. It’s like death and taxes, they’re all gonna happen, it’s 
just a matter of when. Oh yeah, I want Looney Tunes Spotlight Collection 2 and 3. 
Remember that. And try to find me another jacket, I think that’s the only one in Canada, 
but I want another, that’s as special as that one. I try to tell people that it’s worth $2000 
dollars. Do you believe that? Well, it’s $750 dollar shoes are in there. I know I’m wearing 
pajamas right now, but that’s a $2000 dollar jacket. That’s the best movie ever. I 
remember at Baycrest, ‘cause I had to go there a lot, um, they were always very nice. 
The only people…there’s a couple of people that I didn’t like. There was one lady, I forget 
her name, did they physio, she was just like (makes sounds).  I said, you’re the one that 
needs physio, not me. But anyways, but everything else was great, um, at Baycrest. They 
were excellent. Good coffee, eh. Oh yeah. I want Looney, Looney Tunes Spotlight 
Collection 2 and 3. Yeah, about my iPod. I don’t, how do I get it rebooted. It won’t boot 
up. Like it’s, it’s like, it won’t, its power’s out, but it won’t start. Like it won’t, there’s 
things I have to go through that don’t do a thing. And I had to go to Baycrest, to go see 
(neuropsychologist’s name), that’s when I had my stroke, right? So I’d go in, and I’d 
always visit there, and I had to go through all that, and get to each different place, and 
I’d always go up to (neuropsychologist’s name). And, because you have to go, when you 
go to do your iPod training there, it’s a specialty course… it’s called Memory Link, right? 
Um, I was the fastest one ever to complete the course, and it drives me crazy cause I 
have no wifi here, and it place, it drives me a little nuts. Like some of the stuff I have is 
nice, but there’s a lot of stuff here, like, I just look at the walls, and I go, “am I in a jail 
cell” like, come on guys. Can I add a little bit? I said to my brother, he’s, cause he paints 
for a living, right?  Can you put like a taupe and a beige, a little two tone? You know 
where the sun hits it can be a little darker and where the sun doesn’t hit, make it lighter. 
You know, just so it, makes the place look like it gets lived in by a human being. And look, 
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I don’t know what somebody did to this wall, looks like somebody smacked through it in 
the middle, or something. I don’t know what they did. There’s my fake Monets. [pause, 
followed by experimenter probe] Oh, it’s guaranteed I’ll put a stain on something. I don’t 
know. Look. I got a stain here, a stain here. Eh, and I want another replayed jacket like 
that. I think that’s the only one in existence in Canada. Oh yeah. I want Looney Tunes 
Spotlight Collection 2 and 3. Have you ever seen those? Marvin the Martian. He’s the 
best. The guy who has the little broom in his head. He’s excellent. Marvin the Martian is 
the best. This guy, right here.  I guarantee it’s a coffee spill. I don’t eat pomegranate.   
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